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I.

INTRODUCTION

A. The Multilateral Setting: The Geneva Conference of 1974-1977
and Protection of Civilians
In 1977, after four years of intense negotiations by a diverse group
of representatives from the world community, the 1977 Protocols
Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions' (the Protocols) were
finalized. The Geneva Conference that produced the Protocols was
the first international conference aimed at the progressive development
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1987. This article is based on a thesis submitted as part of the author's LL.M.
degree at George Washington University. The views expressed in this article are those
of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
I Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I), and
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II),
Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annexes I & II, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391
(Protocol I), 1442 (Protocol II) (1977); and in, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 457 (Protocol
I), 502 (Protocol II) (1978) [hereinafter Protocol I or II].
According to Ambassador George H. Aldrich, the head of the United States
Delegation to the Conference that adopted the 1977 Geneva Protocols, representatives
of more than 100 governments assembled in Geneva for more than eight months
of conference sessions from 1974-1977. Aldrich, New Life for the Laws of War, 75
AM. J. INT'L L. 764, 764 (1981) [hereinafter Aldrich, New Life].
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and codification of the humanitarian law of armed conflict since the
1949 Conference that produced the four Geneva Conventions (the
Conventions). 2 Moreover, the Conference not only addressed protection of war victims but also reached beyond the scope of the earlier
Conventions by grappling with the rules on the conduct of combat
operations, an area that had not been developed in an international
instrument since the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land.' This substantial passage of time
made more onerous the problems inherent in the regulation of armed
conflicts. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that the product
of the consensus-building process at Geneva continues to fuel spirited
debate more than a decade after the Protocols were opened for
4
signature.

2 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, openedfor signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces
at Sea, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75
U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
openedfor signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S.
135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Civilians Convention; collectively cited as 1949 Geneva
Conventions]. The Geneva Conventions entered into force for the United States on
February 2, 1956. For a collection of all of the treaties concerning the law of war
cited in this article, see TIH LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS (D. Schindler & J. Toman
eds., 2d rev. ed. 1981) [hereinafter SCHINDLER & TOMAN].
1 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land,
with annex of regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, 1 Bevans
631, reprinted in SCMNDLER & TOmAN, supra note 2, at 57 [hereinafter 1907 Hague
Convention IV].
The view of the late Professor Waldemar A. Solf, generally shared by commentators, is that with the exception of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocols, the law of
the Hague "was not updated from the turn of the century until 1977." Solf,
Protection of Civilians Against the Effects of Hostilities Under Customary International Law and Under Protocol I, 1 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 117, 124 (1986).
See also Aldrich, New Life, supra note 1, at 765 & n.9.
Although the distinctions have blurred over time, "the law of The Hague"
related mainly to limitations on the methods of making war while "the law of
Geneva" (exemplified by the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their precursors) addressed protection of victims of war. Levie, Recent Development in the Humanitarian
Law of War, 4 PUB. L.F. 369, 369-70 (1985).
For a snapshot of the ongoing polemics among United States commentators,
compare Roberts, The New Rules for Waging War: The Case Against Ratification
of Additional Protocol I, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 109 (1985) with Aldrich, Progressive
Development of the Laws of War: A Reply to Criticisms of the 1977 Geneva Protocol
1, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 693 (1986) [hereinafter Aldrich, Progressive Development].
4
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The general approach of the Conference was not to effect a wholesale replacement of the 1907 Hague and 1949 Geneva Conventions
but rather to supplement them.' Accordingly, in Protocol I, for
example, the many provisions do not form a "tightly woven whole".
Among the 102 articles of this Protocol are provisions that build on
the prior Conventions as well as provisions dealing with subjects that
received little or no treatment in the earlier conferences. 6 It is generally
agreed that the most important, and overdue, aspect of the Protocols
is their profound emphasis on the protection of civilian populations.
In particular, several articles place constraints on combat activities,
in the interest of protecting civilians.' Even those who are critical of
the Protocols have applauded provisions regarding civilian protections
as being not only substantive developments beyond prior instruments
8
but also capable of practical implementation.
The Protocol I civilian protections can be viewed as a convention
within a convention: the study of those articles and civilian protection
in general would occupy a major part of any detailed analysis of the
Protocols or of humanitarian law in general. Although excellent

Another interesting exchange, highlighting the Reagan Administration's misgivings
regarding Protocol I, began with a speech by Douglas J. Feith, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy, followed by Professor Solf's piece in
rebuttal. Compare Feith, Protocol I: Moving Humanitarian Law Backwards, 19
AKRON L. REV. 531 (1986) with Solf, Response to Feith, 20 AKRON L. REV. 261

(1986).

Mallison, The HumanitarianLaw of Armed Conflict Concerning the Protection
of Civilians, 11 INT'L LAW. 102, 105 (1977).

6 Aldrich, New Life, supra note 1, at 765. Ambassador Aldrich points to the
following distinct areas of coverage: direct supplements to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (relating to protecting powers, guerrillas, mercenaries, and prisoners of
war); additions to the 1907 Hague Conventions (regarding methods and means of
warfare and constraints imposed on combat for civilian protection); and matters not
previously developed that stand "virtually on their own as mini conventions" (regarding medical aircraft and civil defense). Id.
. 7 Protocol 1, supra note 1, arts. 35-42, 48-60. As Professor Hamilton
DeSaussure
points out, "What is new in the Protocols of 1977 is the added emphasis placed
on the protection of the civilian population, not only in occupied areas held by the
enemy, but also for the protection of civilians in the homeland." DeSaussure,
Introduction: Symposium on the 1977 Geneva Protocols, 19 AKRON L. REV. 521,
521 (1986).
, After surveying the weaknesses of the Protocols, Professor David P. Forsythe
contended that "there may also be consensus that the most positive aspect is the
effort to protect civilians in an international armed conflict." Forsythe, Three Sessions
of Legislating Humanitarian Law: Forward March, Retreat, and Parade Rest?, 11
INT'L LAW. 131, 137-38 (1977) (citing provisions aimed at protecting items indis-

pensable to the civilian population and assuring humanitarian assistance).
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overviews of the provisions are found in the literature, 9 some civilian
protections in the Protocols have attracted little scrutiny. Instead,
attention has focused more on the major obstacles to ratification by
the United States and other governments.' 0 One area that often escapes
notice in this din is the article on starvation and destruction of
indispensable objects as methods of warfare, and the related articles
on protection of humanitarian relief efforts on behalf of civilians in
time of war."
B. The Problem of Civilian Starvation and the Impediment of
Relief Efforts During Armed Conflict
The practice of starving out combatants to force capitulation is
generally viewed as permissible under humanitarian law.' 2 Regrettably,
however, the practice of starvation of civilians, either deliberately or
as a result of indiscriminate measures, has also been a part of warfare

I See, e.g., Levie, Some Recent Developments in the Law of War, 25 GER. Y.B.
L. 252 (1982); Aldrich, New Life, supra note 1; Glosca, New Code for the
Protection of Civilian Population and Property During Armed Conflicts, 219 INT'L
REV. RED CROSS 287 (1980); Kalshoven, Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts: The Diplomatic Conference, Geneva, 1974-1977 (pt. 2), 9 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 107 (1978); Carnahan,
Protecting Civilians Under the Draft Geneva Protocol: A Preliminary Inquiry, A.
F. L. REv., Winter 1976, at 32.
10 The debate over the Protocols has been advanced in many articles and a number
of symposia in the past ten years. The recent criticism and response found in Major
Guy B. Roberts's and Ambassador Aldrich's articles focused anew on the major
obstacles to ratification of Protocol I, namely provisions on wars of national liberation (art. 1(4)), irregular armed forces (arts. 43, 44), mercenaries (art. 47), and
reprisals (art. 51 and others). See Aldrich, ProgressiveDevelopment, supra note 4,
and Roberts, supra note 4. For interesting papers and published proceedings of
symposia, see Symposium on the 1977 Geneva Protocols, 19 AKRON L. REV. 521
(1986); The American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference: International Humanitarian Law, 31 Am. U. L. REv. 805 (1982); Protocols Additional
to the Geneva Conventions on the Laws of War, 1980 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC.
191.
After lengthy interagency review, the Reagan Administration officially announced
its unsurprising decision not to forward Protocol I to the Senate for advice and
consent. In the letter forwarding Protocol II, the President stated that "Protocol I
is fundamentally and irreconcilably flawed," with "provisions that would undermine
humanitarian law and endanger civilians in war." He specifically cited as unacceptable
the provisions on wars of national liberation and irregular forces. President's Letter
of Transmittal (of Protocol II to the Senate for advice and consent) (Jan. 29, 1987).
Protocol I, supra note 1, arts. 54, 68-71.
12 Rosenblad, Starvation as a Method of Warfare-Conditionsfor Regulations
by Convention, 7 INT'L LAW. 252, 253-55 (1973) (citing experts' treatises and providing
examples in history of sieges directed exclusively at combatants).
INT'L
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"since time immemorial."' 3 History provides many examples, including the Union's blockades and "scorched earth" tactics against
the South in the United States Civil War, the blockades of Germany
14
in both World Wars, and the siege of Leningrad in World War II.
In the post-World War II period we have seen additional, shocking
instances. During the civil war in Nigeria it is said that millions of
Biafran civilians starved to death as a result of being "trapped and
encircled" by the Nigerian Army,'" and the enormity of devastation
wrought by the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia in the late 1970s is
well-documented.

6

1

Even in the late 1980s starvation attends warfare. Despite the
drought recovery of recent years, civil war exacerbates the African
food situation and keeps a number of areas in extremis. 17 Mozambique
has suffered severe food shortages due to abandonment of agriculture
as well as from violent destruction of foodstuffs. 8 Another example

13
H.
14

LEVIE, THE CODE OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 69 (1986).

For brief descriptions of incidents of civilian starvation during warfare through

World War II, see Rosenblad, supra note 12, at 255-56; R. MOFFT, MODERN WAR
AND THE LAW OF WAR 15-16 (1973); and Mudge, Starvation as a Means of Warfare,
4 INT'L LAW. 228, 238-43 (1970).

1' Mudge, supra note 14, at 230 (quoting Fellows, Angering in Africa over West's
Help to Biafra Rises, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1968, at A12, col. 2). See also R.
MOFFIT, supra note 14, at 16 (referencing Government of Nigeria declarations that
starvation of civilians is a legitimate means of warfare). But see T. FARER, THE
LAWS

OF

WAR 25 YEARS AFTER NUREMBERG 21 (1971)

(stating that the Nigerian

Government "constantly reiterated its willingness to allow food shipments into
Biafra" subject to inspections for contraband).
,6See. e.g., W. SHAWCROSS, QUALITY OF MERCY (1984).
1 Citing a February 1987 report by the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), Blaine Harden of the Washington Post reported that Africa
needs less than half the food aid it received during the famine years. Notwithstanding
the improved food situation on the continent, he pointed to five countries in need
of emergency food: Mozambique, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, and Ethiopia. Explaining the existence of the drastic situation in "fertile" Mozambique despite the
improved conditions on the continent, Mr. Harden stated: "The primary reason why
so little imported food is needed across most of Africa is good weather. The primary
reason why so much food is needed in Mozambique is war." Harden, Food Disaster
Threatens Mozambique, Wash. Post, Feb. 4, 1987, at A18, col. 6.
18 In January 1987, FAO alerted the world community of the Mozambican emergency, noting shortages "mainly due to civil strife." U.N. Food & Agric. Org.,
Foodcrops and Shortages: Special Report, No. 1, Jan. 1987. Conditions continued
to worsen through the Spring: "[T]he food situation in Mozambique . . . is deteriorating rapidly. Unless further exceptional measures are taken by the international
community . . . widespread suffering and loss of life is inevitable .... Many now
face possible starvation .... Severe difficulties are being encountered with the

transportation of relief supplies to the rural areas due to civil strife and shortages
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in the news during the summer of 1987 underscored the sensitivity
of relief efforts originating outside a country embroiled in civil war.
Sri Lankan military offensives against Tamil rebels and siege tactics
in the Jaffna peninsula reportedly caused severe food shortages in
that area at the northern tip of the country. 19 India responded with
aid overtures directly to the rebels, drawing angry Sri Lankan protests
on the grounds of violation of territorial sovereignty. 20 Ultimately the
countries reached an agreement under which Sri Lanka would allow
consignments as long as government officials were allowed to inspect
21
supplies and supervise distribution.

of transport facilities and fuel." U.N. Food & Agric. Org., Special Alert-Country:
Mozambique, No. 187, Mar. 2, 1987. A later report blamed "the externally-supported
insurgency of the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO)" for most of the
destruction:
This rebel movement has devised a cold-blooded strategy of destroying
schools, clinics and other social institutions to demoralize the population
and to create insecurity leading to abandonment of agriculture and of entire
villages.
In addition, the rebels blow up manufacturing units like maize mills and
disrupt the transport network in order to bring all production, trade and
exchange activities to a halt.
Mozambique Crisis at CriticalPhase, Africa Recovery (United Nations DESI), No.
1, Feb.-Apr. 1987, at 1, 21.
Later news reports described impediments to relief efforts, Sparks, Rebels Seize
Seven in Mozambique, Wash. Post, May 16, 1987, at A24, col. 1, and the political
polemics regarding assistance by the superpowers, Cattaway, U.S. Shuns Joint Effort
on Mozambican Food Relief, Wash. Post, June 2, 1987, at A26, col. 1.
On the effects of civil war on the African food situation generally, see Christensen

& Hanrahan, African Food Crises: Short-, Medium-, and Long-Term Responses, 70
IOWA L. REV. 1293 (1985).
19India Plans Relief Flotilla for Sri Lankan Tamils, Wash. Post, June 2, 1987,
at A22, col. 1. The government of the ethnic Sinhalese majority in Sri Lanka has
been fighting guerrillas of the Tamil minority since 1983. The Tamil rebels, demanding
cultural and political autonomy, "have maintained bases in southern India, where
they receive strong support from the 50 million Tamils living there." Id.
20 Id.
After an Indian flotilla was turned away on June 3, 1987, see Tarnowski,
Sri Lanka Halts Indian Aid Flotilla, Wash. Post, June 4, 1987, at A33, col. 1,
Indian Air Force planes dropped nearly 25 tons of relief supplies to the Tamils in
Sri Lanka on June 4, 1987. Sri Lanka protested the action as "a naked violation
of our sovereignty . . .and territorial integrity." See Roy, Indian Air Force Drops
Supplies to Sri Lankan Tamils, Wash. Post, June 5, 1987, at A20, col. 5. Prime

Minister Rajiv Gandhi was accused of carrying out the dramatic aerial resupply "to
distract public attention from an array of political problems at home." Roy, Airdrop
Over Sri Lanka Aided Gandhi at Home, Wash. Post, June 8, 1987, at A15, col.
1. 21 Sri
Lanka Will Let Indians Aid Tamils, Wash.
Post, June 16, 1987, at A21,
col. 2.
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In a final tragic example, Palestinians faced starvation in early
1987 due to a siege imposed by Amal Shiite Moslem forces in
Lebanon. The press began to bring the horrific details to the world's
attention in February 1987 in editorials such as the Washington
Post's entry, "Eating Rats in Beirut,

2' 2

23
and in daily news reports.

Fighting between Amal and the Palestinians, competing forces in
Lebanon's political chaos, intensified in late 1986 after a successful
Palestinian initiative at Maghdousheh. Amal responded with a more
forceful siege of several Palestinian refugee camps with the aim of
forcing retreat. 24 In the face of international publicity, Amal began
to allow some relief efforts later in February. 25 Nevertheless, harassment of relief workers and sniper attacks against women venturing
out for food continued. 26 The sieges were finally lifted under the

22 Eating Rats in Beirut, Wash. Post, Feb. 14, 1987, at A22, col. 1: "So wearied
have most outsiders become of the seemingly unending violence, suffering and
disorder in Lebanon that it takes an extraordinary event to draw much attention.
Such an event is taking place now: starvation dire enough to make the victims eat
rats." Id.
23 In early February 1987, a British surgeon trapped in the refugee camp of Burj
al Barajinah succeeded in focusing the attention of the international press on the
horrors going on inside. Food supplies had run out since the late October 1986
imposition of the siege, and inhabitants were eating grass, dogs, cats, mules, and
rats to survive. See, e.g., Boustany, Food Runs Out at Besieged Beirut Camp, Wash.
Post, Feb. 11, 1987, at Al, col. 2.
24 This description of the fighting comes from Boustany, Braving the "Passage
of Death", Wash. Post, Apr. 5, 1987, at Al, A21, col. 1, 2. The following excerpt
provides further insight into the Palestinian/Shiite dispute:
Of all the groups in Lebanon, the two most thoroughly disinherited are
the alien Palestinians, who have no home, and the Shiites, who constitute
a Lebanese majority but do not have commensurate power. The PLO's
military presence in southern Lebanon drew heavy Israeli fire upon the
resident Shiites before Israel invaded and expelled the PLO in 1982. In the
chaos of Lebanon, however, PLO forces have been returning and setting
up in the few areas halfway open to them-in refugee camps around Beirut
and the south. To keep the PLO from consolidating its position and drawing
new Israeli fire upon the Shiites, and to keep the PLO from aiding Lebanese
rivals of the Shiites, Amal has been battling PLO forces in the "camps
war." This is the context in which Amal blockaded Burj al Barajinah.
Eating Rats in Beirut, supra note 22.
25 Boustany, Food Reaches Besieged Palestinian Refugees, Wash. Post, Feb. 16,
1987, at A25, col. 1.
26 Incidents of bloodshed during relief and resupply efforts are described in Braving
the "Passage of Death," supra note 24. Although some deliveries were made between
February and April of 1987, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was rebuffed in several attempts.
Boustany, supra note 25. The thwarted attempts (as well as the successful ones) of
UNRWA during this crisis are described in United Nations press releases. U.N.
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supervision of Syrian soldiers in April 1987. At the end, one of the
besieged described the period as a "long bloodbath. There were no
days better or worse than others. When the hardship was not physical
27
suffering and death, it was hunger and cold."
Upon learning of civilian starvation in Biafra in 1968, Professor
Arthur Allen Leff, writing in a letter to the Editor of the New York
Times, described the obstacles of international law and politics and
urged immediate action: "I don't care much about international law,
Biafra or Nigeria. Babies are dying in Biafra ....
I can't believe
there is much political cost in feeding babies, but if there is let's pay
'2
it; if we are going to be hated, that's the loveliest of grounds.
Regrettably, as current news reports show, there is the same grave
situation today. The suffering of innocents during warfare is not
speculative but real. Against this backdrop, the importance of exploring the modern humanitarian law regarding civilian starvation
and relief can hardly be questioned.
C. The Need for a New Look at an Old Problem: The PostWorld War II Era and the Development of Human Rights Law
Besides the impetus that continued suffering in the world brings
to this inquiry, the dynamic post-World War II developments call
for a fresh look at traditional notions of civilian protection during
armed conflict. Only through a careful evaluation of the important
trends and events of the past forty years may the expectations of
the world community in this field be identified and today's valid
principles of civilian protection be gleaned. Certainly the traditional
development of civilian protections and the crystallization of norms
in the 1949 Geneva Conventions are important starting points. However, recent years reveal important additional developments in the
humanitarian law of armed conflict: the near universal accession to
the 1949 Geneva Conventions and ripening of many key articles of

Dep't Pub. Info., UNRWA Press Releases PAL/1636-1650 (Vienna), Feb. 10-Mar.
18, 1987.
One report summarized the women's tragic resupply attempts as follows: "Amal
announced it would allow women to leave the camp to get food and supplies. But
the women became targets and their journeys into the city became suicide missions.
At least 18 were killed by Amal snipers in a month." Boustany, Syrians Enter Beirut
Camp; Refugees Describe Horrors, Wash. Post, Apr. 8, 1987, at Al, col. 4, A17
col. 1, 3.
27 Syrians Enter Beirut Camp; Refugees Describe Horrors, supra note 26.
28 N.Y. Times, Letter to the Editor, Oct. 4,
1968, at 46 (quoted in Mudge, supra
note 14, at 228).
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those instruments into customary international law; the growing outrage in the world over tragic examples of civilian mistreatment in
warfare, as seen in reactions to practices in Biafra, Vietnam, Cambodia, and even retrospectively to the conduct by both sides in World
War II; and the extensive multilateral consensus process of the 19741977 Geneva Conference and the years of experience since the Conference. Moreover, although it is no small task to examine the above
issues in the law of armed conflict, the inquiry is not complete without
further consideration of the development of human rights law since
the end of World War 11.29 In describing this explosion in human
rights law, Professor Louis B. Sohn stated that "[m]ore has been
done in this area in the last 40 years than in the previous 4000."30
Significantly, although human rights law and humanitarian law are
normally studied as separate disciplines, the two are ever more closely
related in the post-War period. Professor Myres S. McDougal underscores the importance of binding principles of human rights law
to an understanding of the crucial concept of "humanity" in modern
humanitarian law: "To give meaning to the policy complementary
to military necessity, that of humanity, we must consider the immense
development of human rights law since 1945."'
Among the human rights concepts that bear particularly on civilian
protections in the area of starvation and relief are the nonderogable
right to life, the related prohibition against genocide, and the emerging
rights to food and humanitarian assistance. Additionally, the extensive
influence of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights3 2 and subsequent declarations and resolutions not only underscore the strength
of modern human rights principles but also signal the changing ways
in which international legal norms are developed and refined in the
post-World War II, United Nations era.33 Any study of modern
civilian protections during armed conflict would therefore be deficient
without a careful analysis of these matters.
29 McDougal, Law and Minimum World Public Order: Armed Conflict in Larger
Context, 3 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 21, 30 (1984).
10Sohn, Fundamental Guarantees: Human Rights (paper presented to the Seminario Interamericano Sobre Seguridad del Estado, Derechos Humanos Y Derecho
Humanitario, San Jose, Costa Rica, Sept. 27-Oct. 2, 1982) (copy on file with the
author) [hereinafter Sohn, Fundamental Guarantees].
31 McDougal, supra note 29, at 30.
31 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at
71 (1948).
33See generally Sohn, "Generally Accepted" International Rules, 61 WASH. L.
Rnv. 1073 (1986).

GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L.

[Vol. 19:1

As a foundation for the analysis, this study will first examine the
historical development of civilian protections in armed conflict and
the codification of principles in the Civilians Convention. The "military necessity"/"humanity" calculus of humanitarian law and the
classic norms regarding civilian protections during armed conflict will
be addressed. Also, the specific area of civilian starvation and relief
will be examined as a subset of the traditional concepts of civilian
protection. With these foundational matters in place, the inquiry will
turn to the all-important post-World War II era in humanitarian law
and the key areas of human rights law that bear on the issues at
hand. The broad question to be answered is, to what extent have
the events of the past forty years affected the world community's
expectations and values with respect to civilian starvation and relief
during armed conflict?
The next section will examine in detail the manner in which the
1974-1977 Geneva Conference dealt with the starvation and relief
problems. This study will analyze the provisions emanating from that
Conference in the light of the negotiating papers and the assessments
of participants and commentators. Of particular interest will be how
the conferees dealt with the imperative of incorporating the post-War
experience and enhanced concepts of "humanity" into the provisions
without unduly and unrealistically diminishing the "military necessity" part of the calculus.
After the presentation of the Protocol I articles, the question will
remain, how well do the articles reflect principles of customary international law and contemporary values of the world community
regarding the problem of civilian starvation and relief? By reference
to the previous analysis of post-War influences and the concomitant
community values and principles of international law, this analysis
will assess the articles' vitality, even without near-unanimous ratification of Protocol I. The articles' reflection of modern principles as
well as the validity and workability of the specific rules set forth to
guarantee respect for those principles will be judged. In short, this
study will attempt to show the degree to which a party to an armed
conflict today must consider itself bound by the principles and rules
of the Protocol I articles on starvation and relief, whether or not it
has ratified the instrument.
Although this inquiry raises many issues, the scope of the study
is limited to a narrow range of Protocol I provisions. Focusing on
just one of many aspects of civilian protection affords an opportunity
for a comprehensive treatment of the issues surrounding sustenance
and relief of civilians during warfare. Moreover, the choice of a
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discrete area such as this provides a representative, yet manageable,
medium for exploring the confluence of the current "human rights"
and "humanitarian" law disciplines. Careful scrutiny of one facet
of the Protocol I civilian protections, from a number of angles, yields
not only insight into specific progressive developments in an important
area but also provides a glimpse of the larger structure of civilian
protections in modern international humanitarian law.
Because of this narrow scope of inquiry, there are a number of
important related matters which are outside the scope of this study.
First, the study emphasizes Protocol I articles and the international
armed conflict scenario. One should note, however, not only the apt
characterization of many so-called noninternational armed conflicts
in recent years as "international, ' 3 4 but also the fact that a great
deal of the Protocol I analysis applies mutatis mutandis to the Protocol II situation in the area of starvation and relief." Moreover,
the study does not address in detail the other Protocol I provisions
regarding civilian protections, and the controversial proscription against
reprisals, areas that have received a great deal of treatment in the
literature.3 6 Even certain provisions that bear on sustenance items and

14 Because
many "civil wars" have international aspects, Protocol I provisions
may apply to a civil war even though it appears at first blush that the conflict is
"noninternational." Although the matter is both complex and controversial, it has
been generally suggested that an internationlized civil war (one characterized by the
intervention of the armed forces of a foreign power) must be broken down into its
international and noninternational components. Gasser, InternationalNon-International Armed Conflicts: Case Studies of Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Lebanon,
31 AM. U. L. REv. 911, 915 (1982). Some of the recent conflicts that have occasioned
starvation and problems with passage of relief consignments have international
aspects, including, Israel's involvement in Lebanon, id. at 921-23, South Africa's
support of rebels in Mozambique, and India's pro-Tamil efforts in Sri Lanka.
31 The correlative provisions in Protocol II are contained in Article 14 (protection
of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population) and Article 18
(relief societies and relief actions). See SCINDLER & TomAN, supra note 2, at 627.
The Protocol II articles are similar in content and effect to those in Protocol I.
However, the Protocol II provisions are shorter, as "[tlhe authors of Protocol II
were rather sparing with their words in the final version of the Part concerning the
'civilian population."' Nahlik, A Brief Outline of InternationalHumanitarianLaw,
241 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 187, 224 (1984). Additionally, there is increasing support
in the literature for universal applicability of basic norms such as protection of
civilian sustenance, particularly in the light of modern human rights developments.

See generally, T. MERON,

HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNAL STRIFE: THEIR INTERNATIONAL

PROTECTION (1987) (noting the binding nature of Article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions, and the applicability of human rights law in situations of both international and internal armed conflict).
36 See, e.g., Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 49 (definition of attacks and scope of
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protection of relief channels, such as the special emphasis on children
in Article 77 and the rules applicable in occupied territory, are not
treated in depth here.3 7 Despite such exclusions, the focus on civilian
starvation is important not only because the area is representative of
Protocol I's upward development of the law regarding protections
for civilians generally, but also because this area, even standing alone,
"undoubtedly could be one of the most humanitarian provisions ever
adopted as a part of the law of war." 38
Notwithstanding the gravity of the problem and the apparent timeliness of an inquiry into civilian starvation and relief during warfare,
some consider any venture into humanitarian law a useless exercise.
The sentiments that, on the one hand, hoped-for world peace will
soon render humanitarian law obsolete, and on the other hand "that
war, being hideous, is beyond the ken of law," exist simultaneously.3 9
But the following basic points may answer the critics. First, because
armed conflicts continue in many places with no end in sight, determined efforts to develop humanitarian law remain crucial "to
permit efficient use of military force while preserving humanitarian
values." 40 Next, perhaps the strongest buttress for the humanitarian

application), art. 50 (definition of civilians and civilian population), art. 51 (protection
of the civilian population, including general proscription against civilian reprisals),
art. 52 (general protection of civilian objects), and art. 57 (precautions in attack).
For citations to works that examine these articles, see supra notes 4 & 9.
11 The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 addressed both the special needs of
children as particularly vulnerable victims of war as well as protection of civilians
in occupied territory. For example, relief actions for those in occupied territory are
extensively regulated by Articles 55 and 59 (and several articles that follow Article
59) of that Convention. Accordingly, although Protocol I Articles 69 and 77 represented improvements, the need for development of the law to protect civilians of
all ages in nonoccupied territory was most critical.
38

H.

LEVIE,

supra note 13, at 69.

19T. FARES, supra note 15, at 5. Some critics acknowledge successes of humanitarian law but contend that warfare should not be regulated so that the enormity
of the consequences might revolt the conscience and lead to the abolition of war.
Telford Taylor rebuts this view, noting that "this has been a pretty bloody century
and people do not seem to shock very easily." T. TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM:
AN AMERIcAN TRAGEDY 39 (1970).
40 Mallison, supra note 5, at 102-03. It should also be noted that the line between
war and peace is often blurred, and the factual problems of war "derive from a
global process of coercion, . . . a process that goes on all the time with varying
degrees of intensity." McDougal, supra note 29, at 25 (citing M. McDoUGAL & F.
FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION (1961)). Thus, as stated by Professor McDougal, "There exists

law about every feature of this process, in all its intensities, from the times that
are called peace to the times that are called war." Id.
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lawyer is that despite the horrors of war through the ages, history
4
shows that efforts to refine humanitarian law have not been in vain. '

Some estimate that past developments in the world legal order, now
taken for granted, have saved hundreds of thousands of lives.4 2 By
virtue of near-universal acceptance of earlier Geneva Conventions,
for example, protected medical personnel now often save the wounded
who, abandoned on the battlefield, often died in the past. 43 Also,
the prisoner of war has gained not only international recognition of
his status, but also substantive protection as a result of Hague and
44
Geneva instruments from the turn of the century through 1949.

" Although the major humanitarian law advances came in the 20th Century, a
number of rules now considered elementary (e.g., the prohibition against attacks
during a truce and immunity of civilian property) have a much longer history. In
this light, one author answered the "motley of cynics, chauvinists, and idealists"
as follows:
[T]heir position is absurd. The record of armed conflict between political
entities swells with evidence of recognized and enforced restraints

....

The

momentary advantages of rule violation were often eschewed for the benefits
of an ordered belligerence. One dramatic illustration is the tale of a Christian
knight who, during a period of truce, effected a successful sortie into a
neighboring Islamic state. Returning in triumph to his own lord's capital
bearing captured notables, he was promptly seized, tried, and executed.
T. FAMRR, supra note 15, at 5.
As an example of the classical "gentleman's rules" of warfare, another writer
alluded to the aftermath of the battle of Jena, when the "retreating Prussians
endured without fires the bitter cold of an October night in Central Europe rather
than seize civilian stores of wood which lay at hand but for which they were unable
to pay." F. VEALE, ADVANCE TO BARBAISM 107 (1968).
42 "[I]n the past century, . .. humanitarian law has saved hundreds of thousands
of human lives that would otherwise have been added to the millions of those lost
in the fighting." Hay, International Committee of the Red Cross, 31 AM. U. L.
REv. 811, 815 (1982) (introductory remarks to American Red Cross-Washington
College of Law Conference: International Humanitarian Law).
Pointing specifically to the rules requiring that a surrendering enemy be spared,
forbidding denial of quarter, and ensuring minimum protections for prisoners of
war, Telford Taylor wrote, "Now, these requirements are followed more often than
not, and for that reason millions are alive today who would otherwise be dead."

T.

TAYLOR,

supra note 39, at 35-36.

11The First Geneva Convention gave protection to medical orderlies wearing the
Red Cross emblem. Hay, supra note 42, at 815. The protection of medical personnel
and facilities is a prime example cited by Telford Taylor when he wrote, "They
[the laws of armed conflict] work .... If it were not regarded as wrong to bomb
military hospitals, they would be bombed all of the time instead of some of the

time." T.

TAYLOR,

supra note 39, at 39.

It is only necessary to consider the rules on taking prisoners of war to
realize the enormous saving of life for which [the laws of armed conflict]
have been responsible. Millions of French, British, German and Italian

soldiers captured in Western Europe and Africa were treated in general
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Accordingly, the value of an analysis of relatively new protections

for civilians, a class of war victims in desperate need of attention,
is indisputable.
Despite the successes of humanitarian law, discussions of new or
emerging norms on the "humanity" side of the equation often meet

with the criticism that such norms have not been established or are
not part of international law. Indeed, a good bit of the work in this
area advances principles that by objective standards are more aspirational than settled. 45 Nevertheless, as B.G. Ramcharan stated in
rebuttal to such complaints about human rights lawyers (but equally
appropriate in the humanitarian law context):
This is to be expected, but it must not deter the international human
rights lawyer. For he is rooted in the most solid of bases for
determining the validity of international norms: the universal conscience of the world's peoples, which is by far the best form of the
''general recognition" so often reiterated as the basis of obligation
in international law. 46

Finally, perhaps the best response to critics of humanitarian law
comes from the simple statement of the late Professor Richard R.
Baxter: "A little less talk about the obsolescence of the law of war
' 47
might . . . be welcomed by the victims of warfare.
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CILIAN PROTECTIONS IN TRADITIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW

Rules and customs governing the conduct of armed conflict have
evolved from centuries of warfare. 4 Despite the harsh realities of
compliance with The Hague and Geneva requirements, and returned home
at the end of the [Second World War].
T. TAYLOR, supra note 39, at 40.
4 In discussing the subject of this paper with Professor Sohn during an interview,
the author acknowledged that some of the paper's notions might be viewed as
"aspirational." Professor Sohn responded quickly that one should not be hesitant
to advance such ideas and indicated that he had often heard similar criticism of his
own work. He cited criticisms of his early position that the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights represented binding norms of international law-a position which
became widely accepted over time. Interview with Professor Louis B. Sohn, Woodruff
Professor of International Law, University of Georgia School of Law and Bemis
Professor of International Law, Emeritus, Harvard Law School (July 24, 1987).
4' Ramcharan, The Concept and Dimension of the Right to Life, in THE RIGHT
To LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (B. Ramcharan ed. 1985).
47 Baxter, A Weary Word on the Law of War, 59 Am. J. INT'L L. 920, 920
(1965).
4 For sketches of early historical development of principles of restraint in warfare,
see Solf, supra note 3, at 118-20; and R. MOFFIT, supra note 14, at 1-3.
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violence throughout history, a generally acknowledged basic premise
of humanitarian law is that destruction beyond actual military ne'cessity is "not only immoral and wasteful of scarce resources, but
...
also counter-productive to the attainment of the political objectives for which military force is used." ' 49 Accordingly, the "overriding
objective of humanitarian law is to minimize unnecessary destruction
of human and material values." 5 0
That violence against noncombatants is unnecessary and therefore
falls outside the legitimate use of force in warfare appears axiomatic.
Indeed, humanitarian law has for centuries recognized the distinction
between combatants and noncombatants, the cornerstone of civilian
protection." What follows is an overview of the classical tenets of
civilian protection as refined in the humanitarian law through the
time of the 1949 Geneva Conference. The analysis will examine the
often misunderstood dichotomy between the existence of norms and
compliance with them, in an effort to identify principles considered
valid notwithstanding even frequent violations of the principles. Finally, this section will address the traditional concepts as applied to
the specific case of civilian starvation and relief.
A. The FoundationalPrinciples of "Military Necessity" and
"'Humanity"
1.

Overview

In addressing the conceptual underpinning of international humanitarian law, namely the military necessity/humanity dichotomy,

41 Solf, supra note 3, at 117. In The Paquete Habana case, 175 U.S. 677 (1900),
the United States Supreme Court recognized this principle as one of long standing
in holding that coastal fishing vessels with no role in the war effort were immune
from attack or capture.
Mallison & Mallison, International Humanitarian Law of Coercion Control
(outline for course taught at the National Law Center, George Washington University,
5o

Spring 1987) (on file with the author).

"' "It was over [three-and-one-half] centuries ago that Hugo Grotius made the
classical distinction between civilians and combatants." Penna, Customary International Law and Protocol I: An Analysis of Some Provisions, in STUDIES AND
rARAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES 201, 218
(C. Swinarski ed. 1984) (footnote omitted) (also citing subsequent humanitarian law
instruments that employed the distinction). According to Professor Solf, Grotius
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HuJmA

distilled from the practice of states over the centuries a systematic outline of "how
that practice had hardened into the law of nations." Solf, supra note 3, at 120
(citing H. GROTIUS, DE JuRE BELLI ET PACIs LmRi TREs (F. Kelsey trans. 1925 of
1625 ed.)).
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Professor Mallison stated that as long as there is armed conflict, the
international law applicable to it must "permit efficient use of military
force while preserving humanitarian values and making these two
apparently irreconcilable objectives as mutually consistent as possible." 5 2 In the same vein, Professors McDougal and Feliciano identified
military necessity as humanitarian law's "key concept", which "may
be said to authorize such destruction, and only such destruction, as
is necessary, relevant and proportionate to the prompt realization of
legitimate belligerent objectives." 53
In addition to the restraint inherent in "military necessity" (that
is, deliberate destruction beyond necessity being violative of the principle, by definition), the concept of "humanity" gives rise to additional restraints. The umbrella-like humanity concept is that body of
community values ("humanitarian" or "moral") that have led to
additional restraints on belligerent conduct not strictly required by
the principle of military necessity. In the Western world, humanity
in warfare gained a foothold when Western rulers and armies had
contact with Eastern humanitarianism shown by Saladin, whose compassion for war victims proved him to be "the most chivalrous and
great-hearted conqueror of his own, and perhaps of any age." ' S4 Later,
in perhaps the most famous encapsulation of the factors that temper
military necessity, the Martens Clause of the 1907 Hague Convention
IV underscored the vitality in the law of armed conflict of "the
principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and
the dictates of the public conscience."" Indeed, the crucial core of
principles of civilian protection are often described as flowing directly
56
from the principle of humanity.
52

Mallison, supra note 5, at 102-03.

51 M. McDouGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER:
THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 72 (1961). According to the

authors, the fundamental policy embraced in the military necessity concept "[is]
modestly expressed as the minimizing of unnecessary destruction of values." Id.
'

W.T.

MALLISON & S.V. MALLISON,

THE

PALESTINE PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW AND WORLD ORDER 324-25 & n.168 (1986) [hereinafter MALLISON & MALLISON,
THE PALESTINE PROBLEM] (quoting S. LANE POOLE, SALADIN AND THE FALL OF THE
KINGDOM OF JERUSALEM 234 (1964)).
"

1907 Hague Convention IV, supra note 3, Preamble. The Martens Clause is

named for its Russian author, Fyodor de Martens. See generally Miyazaki, The
Martens Clause and International Humanitarian Law, in

STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON

(C. Swinarski
ed. 1984) (examining the great influence and continued vitality of the Martens Clause
in subsequent humanitarian law development).
36 See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of the Air Force Pamphlet, The Conduct of Armed
INTERNATIONAL

HUMANITARIAN

LAW IN HONOR OF JEAN PICTET 433
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Military Necessity: The Broad and Narrow Views

Before focusing on specific civilian protections, a closer look at
the key concept of military necessity is warranted. Although the
commentators express many different views on the principle,5 7 there
is general agreement that at the very least military necessity prohibits
a "Carthaginian peace"-that is, comprehensive devastation of the
enemy's land and people.58 This fundamental principle was codified
in the Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention IV and
has been authoritatively endorsed many times since then: "The right
of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited." 5 9 The question remains, however, whether any additional protections are embodied in the traditional principle of military necessity.
Under the broad interpretation of military necessity, little more
than purposeless brutality is ruled out. This view treats military
necessity as an overriding condition that validates conduct otherwise
prohibited as long as the conduct can be shown to confer some sort
of military advantage. Thus, acts such as killing prisoners of war
when maintaining them might affect the success of the mission, or
direct bombardment of civilian populations when it is believed resulting demoralization might hasten defeat of the adversary, would

Conflict and Air Operations, para. 1-3a(2) (1976) [hereinafter Air Force Pamphlet]
(attributing to the principle of humanity the specific prohibition against unnecessary
suffering, the rule of proportionality, and the immunity of civilians from being
objects of attack). See also Rogers, Conduct of Combat and Risks Run by the
Civilian Population, 1982 REVUE DE DROIT PENAL MrrATRE ET DE DRorT DE LA
GUERRE 293, 295 (describing humanity as "fundamental to the essential rule of
proportionality").
S7 "The basic difficulty in this fundamental policy principle of military necessity
is [that it] contains an inherent and infinitely manipulatable obscurity in its reference
to the 'legitimate objectives of violence."' M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra
note 53, at 74 (citing several differing formulations of commentators). See also T.
TAYLOR, supra note 39, at 35 (characterizing military necessity as "a matter of
infinite circumstantial variation").
8 The term "Carthaginian peace" comes from "the greatest military conflict of
the ancient epoch, the Punic Wars, [in which] Rome saw fit to utterly eliminate her
arch-rival Carthage, sowing salt in the grounds where Carthage once flourished."
R. MoFITr, supra note 14, at 1. See also M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICLANO, supra
note 53, at 43, where the authors state that an underlying assumption in humanitarian
law "is that extermination, peace of the Carthaginian variety, is not a permissible
objective of international violence; if it were, all legal limitations would be entirely
pointless."
,91907 Hague Convention IV, supra note 3, art. 22 (of annexed Regulations).
See generally T. FARER, supra note 15, at 16-17 & n.8 (with citation to later
endorsement of this language).

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 19:1

not be violations of the law of war under the expansive interpretation. 60 This position is often attributed to nineteenth century German
theorists and labelled "Kriegsraison"-shorthand for Kriegsraison
geht vor Kriegsmanier (loosely translated: "The demands of the mil6
itary situation take precedence over the customs and laws of war."). '

Contrasting with this broad view of military necessity are interpretations that accord military necessity stature as a basic principle,
but not as one that displaces all the other rules and principles of
humanitarian law. A classic expression of this narrower reading is
in the famous instructions written by Professor Francis Lieber of
Columbia College, New York, and promulgated by President Abraham Lincoln to the United States Army as General Order No. 100
in 1863. In the "Lieber Code", measures that meet the military
necessity test are those that are "indispensable for securing the ends
of war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages
of war." ' 62 As an example of actions that would violate this crucial
concept, a commander may view as "necessary" such measures as
feigning cease-fire or surrender to take advantage of the adversary's
compliance, attacking disabled or captured combatants, and refusal
of quarter. Proponents of the narrower view contend that military
necessity cannot be invoked to justify these and other measures which
63
are otherwise forbidden by international law.
3. Comparison: SubstantialAuthority Supports the Narrow
View
Although the actual occurrence of widespread violations of the
laws of armed conflict might be thought to justify the broad view, 64
in fact, the narrow interpretation of military necessity rests on much

60 See Nardin, The Laws of War and Moral Judgment, in
WORLD ORDER 437, 444 (R. Falk, F. Kratochwil & S. Mendlovitz

2 STUDIES IN A JUST
eds. 1985) (criticizing
the broad view of military necessity shared by noted commentators).
61 Kriegsraison is described more fully in R. MOFFIT, supra note 14, at 5-6. See
also the description (and denunciation) of Kriegsraisonin Air Force Pamphlet, supra

note 56, at para. 1-3a(l).
62

U.S.

DEP'T OF WAR,

THE UNITED STATES IN THE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE GOVERNMENT

OF THE ARMIES OF

FIELD, GENERAL ORDERS No. 100 (1863), art. 14, reprinted

in SCHINDLER & ToMAN, supra note 3, at 6, (emphasis added) [hereinafter Lieber
Code]; MALLISON, THE PALESTINE PROBLEM, supra note 54, at 325. For interesting
background on Francis Lieber and the difficulties he faced as he pressed for adoption

of a code on the "law and usages of war," see R.
THE LAW OF WAR (1983).
63 See Nardin, supra note 60, at 444-45.
64 See infra notes 69-72 and accompanying

text.

HARTIGAN,

LIEBER'S CODE OF
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firmer ground. First, the expansive view is not compatible with the
international instruments that constitute the primary sources of humanitarian law. Neither the Hague nor the Geneva Conventions allow
a military necessity justification for suspension of fundamental rules
such as those prohibiting treacherous acts, harming prisoners of war,
and refusal of quarter. Indeed, the 1949 Geneva Conventions assert
that such acts "are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in
any place whatsoever" (Article 3), and that states party to the Conventions must respect their provisions "in all circumstances" (Article
1).65 Accordingly, in the light of virtually unanimous assent to the
Geneva Conventions by the world community, 66 it follows that certain

rules admit of no derogations by a military commander regardless
of how advantageous or even "necessary" to the war effort such
derogations may appear.
Second, the narrower view is the one most often reflected in military
codes. From their beginning in the Lieber rules, United States military
manuals have reflected the narrow view with a high degree of consistency. 67 The adherence of these manuals to the narrow interpretation

65 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 2, arts. 1 and 3. Articles 1 and 3 are
common to all four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. In addition to this "positive"
evidence that conventional humanitarian law supports the narrow interpretation,
Nardin cites "negative" evidence as well. The Conventions occasionally provide that
particular prohibitions may be overridden in exceptional circumstances (e.g., 1907
Hague Convention IV, Article 23a, prohibition against destruction or seizure of
enemy property unless "imperatively demanded by the necessities of war"). Accordingly, where there is no reference to a military necessity qualification, the
particular prohibition must be regarded as absolute. Nardin, supra note 60, at 445.
Not only are more states party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions than are party
to the United Nations Charter (164 for the former, 159 for the latter), but there
also is compelling authority to support the Conventions as reflective of customary
international law. See infra notes 164-70 and accompanying text.
67 Nardin's survey of the regulations found "clear expression of the narrow
interpretation . . . in successive American manuals." Nardin, supra note 60, at 447,
citing specifically U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL, F.M. 27-10, THE LAW
OF LAND WARFARE (1956), para. 3a [hereinafter 1956 U.S. ARmy MANUAL]:
The prohibitory effect of the law of war is not minimized by "military
necessity" which has been defined as that principle which justifies those
measures not forbidden by international law which are indispensable for
securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible. Military
necessity has been generally rejected as a defense for acts forbidden by the
customary and conventional laws of war inasmuch as the latter have been
developed and framed with consideration for the concept of military necessity.
But see T. TAYLOR, supra note 39, at 35-36 (contending that the field manuals are
at best ambiguous on the issue).
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is compelling support for its validity, since humanitarian law conventions require issuance of military regulations in conformity with
their provisions. In fulfilling this duty, military officials would be
unlikely to foreclose military options by incorporating greater restrictions than those required by international law. Accordingly, of
particular import are military instructions such as those issued by the
United States Air Force, denouncing the Kriegsraison doctrine as
"clearly rejected" at Nuremberg and stating that "[a]rmed conflict
must be carried on within the limits of international law, including
the restraints inherent in the principle of 'necessity'.' '68 The final
clause in the instruction would be superfluous were it not for the
intent to underscore for the benefit of commanders the principle that
international law requires them to be concerned about much more
than the "necessities" of war faced in given scenario.
4. Postscript on the Compliance/Validity Problem: Do
Violations Shatter the Norms?
The readiness of some commentators to embrace the broad view
of military necessity is attributable in part to a tendency to draw
from violations the conclusion that the norms must be invalid. That
is, notwithstanding wide assent to provisions such as the Martens
Clause and many absolute prohibitions, the view is that the excesses
of war have shattered the norms. An example often cited, and which
will be addressed in more depth below, is the bombing of civilian
populations by both sides during World War II. The argument posits
that this conduct not only reflected an expansive principle of military
necessity 'but also constituted an invalidation of the principle of
civilian immunity. In short, some authors conclude that rules that
have been substantially violated during a conflict can no longer be
69
regarded as constituting a part of the laws of war.
Air Force Pamphlet, supra note 56, at para. 1-3a(l).
Nardin attributes this view to T. TAYLOR, supra note 39, and to Wasserstrom,
The Laws of War, 56 THE MONIST 1 (1972). Nardin, supra note 60, at 448-49 &
n. 17. Taylor's blurring of principles and violations is evident in the following passage:
"Whatever may have been the laws of war before the Second World War, by the
time the war ended there was not much law left." T. TAYLOR, supra note 39, at
140. See also R. MOFFIT, supra note 14, at 7 ("In the last World War, we have
seen classical military necessity degenerate into Kriegsraison . . ").
Many people are quick to conclude that violations mean that international rules
are invalid. However, Professor Levie's simple comparison of international and
domestic law is helpful in clearing up the confusion on this point. Writing about
Hague and Geneva law, he noted: "These are still valid rules: some of them have
been disregarded and violated, just as every country has laws that are disregarded
and violated, but they are none the less valid." Levie, supra note 3, at 369.
68

'-

19891

CIVILIAN STARVATION

Although humanitarian law's "disorderly combination of customary and conventional rules ' 70 causes uncertainty, the authoritative
conventions 71 cut sharply against the position that violations by one
or even by many parties invalidate the rules. The 1907 Hague Convention IV identifies forbidden acts but neither refers to, nor carves
out an exception for, military necessity. Moreover, the Geneva Conventions are filled with provisions defining proscribed acts, addressing
accountability for violations, and limiting the freedom of parties to
withdraw from obligations. Accordingly, in these instruments to which
virtually the entire world community has assented, "[t]here is little
S.. to support and much to counteract any easy connection between
'7
violation and invalidity.

2

Finally, violations of customary principles do not a priori constitute
invalidation of the present norms or creation of new norms. Even
in the face of flagrant violations, an analysis of norms must include,
inter alia, a careful assessment of the world community's values and
expectations, which may be vastly different from those attributed to
violators. Significantly, although promulgated after World War II
violations of the Hague law, the 1949 Geneva Conventions repeated
the key protective principles from this law as reflective of the postWar values of the world community notwithstanding those violations.
Moreover, because of nearly unanimous assent to the majority of
the humanitarian law conventions, there is a particularly heavy burden
on anyone attempting to claim a customary norm that is less protective
than provisions of the 1907 Hague or 1949 Geneva Conventions. In
view of the foregoing, and with the issues of norm violations in
perspective, the great weight of authority supports the view of military
necessity that accords due regard to the other conventional and customary laws of nations that combine with it to form the humanitarian
law of armed conflict.
B. Civilian Protection Principles in Traditional Humanitarian
Law
From the foundation principles of military necessity and humanity
spring further principles relative to the specific area of civilian pro70 Nardin,

supra note 60, at 448.
, Treaty law is at the top of the hierarchy of international law. See Statute of
the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No.
993 (effective October 24, 1945). Moreover, the key humanitarian treaty law (1907

Hague and 1949 Geneva Conventions) is particularly authoritative in light of the
degree of assent to those instruments exhibited by the world community.
72 Nardin,

supra note 60, at 448.
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tection. The following analysis is an examination of those concepts
as developed in the traditional humanitarian law, which for present
purposes will extend through the Nuremberg trials and the codification
of the laws of armed conflict represented by the 1949 Geneva Civilians
Convention. 73 The analysis will touch upon two fundamental principles-the distinction between combatants and noncombatants, and
civilian immunity from attacks-as well as the following more specific
concepts: the prohibition against civilian targeting and indiscriminate
attacks, the requirement to limit attacks to military objectives, and
the rule of proportionality.
1. Cornerstone Principles: Civilian Immunity and the
Distinction Between Combatants and Noncombatants
Following directly from the military necessity principle is the notion
74
that civilians are to be spared from direct attack during warfare.
That civilians should generally be deemed outside the path of war is
evident in the facts of many of the conflicts throughout history, in
which soldiers "were conspicuous in their proud uniforms; and armies
fought each other, and preferred the civilian populations not to mingle
in their business." ' 75 Thus, the principle of distinction between belligerents and the civilian population, and the concomitant immunity
of the latter from direct attack, "found acceptance as a self-evident
7 6
rule of customary law in the second half of the 19th century.
Sources include the Lieber Code,7 7 the St. Petersburg Conference of

11Although at their inception crucial to the crystallization of a number of traditional norms of humanitarian law, the Nuremberg judgments and the Civilians
Convention have, over time, taken on even more importance in the post-War era.
The influence of the Civilians Convention will be further explored below in the
analysis of humanitarian law evolution in the post-War era. See infra notes 164-70
and accompanying text.
74 See Roling, The Significance of the Laws of War, in CURRENT PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 133, 142 (A. Cassese ed. 1975) (reasoning that attacking civilians
causes superfluous injury violative of the humanitarian law principle against unnecessary suffering during warfare).
71 F. KALSHOVEN, TI-m LAW OF WARFARE

31 (1973).

Id. For a succinct treatment of the sources and the binding nature of the
prohibition against attacks on civilian populations, see S.V. MALLISON & W.T.
71

ARMED CONFLICT IN LEBANON, 1982: HUMANITARIAN LAW IN A REAL
WORLD SETTING 60-61 (1985) (with citation to Professor Lauterpacht description of
civilian immunity as "a clear rule of law").
MALLISON,

77 "[A]s civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so has likewise steadily
advanced . . . the distinction between the private individual belonging to a hostile
country and the hostile country itself, with its men in arms." Lieber Code, supra
note 62, art. 22, reprinted in SCHINDLER & ToMAN, supra note 2, at 7,
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1868,78 the Conference of Brussels of 1874, and the Hague Peace
Conferences of 1899 and 1907.79 The following statement of British
Prime Minister A. Neville Chamberlain, often cited as reflective of
customary international law, describes the immunity principle and
suggests some of the other protections that flow from it:
In the first place, it is against international law to bomb civilians
as such and to make deliberate attacks upon civilian populations....
In the second place, targets which are aimed at from the air must
be legitimate military objectives and must be capable of identification. In the third place, reasonable care must be taken in attacking
those military objectives, so that, by carelessness,
a civilian popu80
lation in the neighborhood is not bombed.
Although the principle of civilian immunity is in the abstract an
important underpinning of civilian protection, the principle must be
further examined in the context of two distinct factual scenarios. The
first is that of attack on civilian populations as such, and the second
is that of attack on a military objective that might collaterally affect
the civilian population. These two scenarios, "so utterly different,
at least from a legal point of view,"'" will be addressed in order.
2. The ProhibitionAgainst Direct Attacks on Civilians and
IndiscriminateAttacks
At first blush it would appear elementary that direct attacks on
civilians, such as terror bombardment, as well as indiscriminate attacks, are violative of the long-standing customary rule of civilian
immunity. As if to underscore the general rule, the Regulations
annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention IV included a specific prohibition against bombardment of undefended places.12 However, despite the applicability of the Hague Conventions and the customary
principles, the norms were called into question when the character
See Roling, supra note 74, at 142; Rogers, supra note 56, at 295.
generally F. KALSHOVEN, supra note 75, at 32-35 (with citations to the
papers of the Conference of Brussels and the 1907 Hague Convention).
80 337 PAIL. DEB.,
H.C. (5th ser.) 937-38 (1938). Indicative of wide assent to
Prime Minister Chamberlain's pronouncement, the principles were included in a
resolution adopted unanimously by the Assembly of the League of Nations in 1938.
L.N. Res. 1, LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 183, at 135-36 (1938). See Penna,
supra note 51, at 218; Cassese, The Geneva Protocols of 1977 on the Humanitarian
Law of Armed Conflict and Customary InternationalLaw, 3 UCLA PAC. BASIN
71

79 See

L.J. 55, 82 (1984).

8ZF. KALSHOVEN, supra note 75, at 60.
82 1907 Hague Convention IV, supra note

3, art. 25.
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of warfare changed in World Wars I and II, "during which time air
power shattered any illusion about the security of the hinterland." 83
Indeed, the dramatic increase in civilian casualties during twentieth
century warfare is indisputable.8 4 However, a more difficult question
is whether the excesses and violations shattered not only the illusion
of security but also the humanitarian law norms prohibiting such
direct and indiscriminate attacks.
Subsumed under the general prohibition against attacks directed at
civilians and civilian objects is the principle prohibiting attacks launched
blindly against combatants and civilians alike, known as indiscriminate
attacks. Although the traditional law of armed conflict acknowledges
that some collateral damage to civilians is unavoidable when bona
fide military objectives are targeted,8 5 indiscriminate attacks cannot
86
be justified, because they "infringe the very principle of distinction.
Despite the prohibition of such attacks, however, a number of rationalizations for their use in warfare have been suggested. 87 Some
theorists claim that workers in war industries are fair game as military
objectives even while in their homes. Others generalize even further
and contend that in modern societies there is no longer a valid
distinction between combatants and the peaceful civilian population,
as virtually everyone is involved in the war effort. Finally, there is
the view that an attempt to break the morale of the civilian population
by terror bombardment is justified by the reasoning that the enemy
may give up sooner if war for them can be made "terrible beyond
endurance. ' 88 Finally, in the light of the experiences of World War
Solf, supra note 3, at 126.
"The principle of distinction . .. came to be exposed to severe strain in the
course of this century. It may suffice to recall . . . the First World War, the Spanish
Civil War, the Second World War, and the Vietnam War [in which] the civilian
populations suffered increasingly under the scourge of war." F. KALsHOVEN, supra
note 75, at 36. See also A. Tikhonov, The Inter-RelationshipBetween the Right to
Life and the Right to Peace, in THE RIGHT TO LE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 97 (B.
Ramcharan ed. 1983), noting a study by Norwegian sociologist Yu Galtung: "From
only five percent of the total loss of human life in World War One, the loss of
civilian population climbed to 4807o in World War Two, and to 8407o in the Korean
War. Id.
85 See infra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
83
14

F.

KALSHOVEN,

supra note 75, at 64.

"Strange though it may seem, there has never been a lack of attempts to find
justifications for indiscriminate warfare." Id. at 38. See also Carnahan, supra note
9, at 39 (alluding to civilian immunity as customary law but indicating that the
matter was "briefly thrown into doubt" by theorists contending that terrorizing
civilian populations was important to a winning war effort).
88 F. KALSHOVEN, supra note 75, at 39 (quoting General Sherman in his justification
for attacks on civilian targets during the U.S. Civil War).
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II, with bombing of civilian populations carried out extensively by
both sides, some contend the practice can no longer be deemed
illegal. s9
Although the World War II excesses are pertinent to the issue,
close scrutiny of the World War II experience reveals that the norms
against civilian bombardment were not defeated; rather, they were
validated. First, despite-the anti-civilian actions, the actors generally
did not attempt to invoke the law of armed conflict in defense of
the practices. In the words of one commentator, "no one seriously
questioned the existence of international norms" on issues of civilian
immunity. 90 This is not surprising, for all of the major and virtually
all minor parties had acceded to the 1907 Hague Convention IV. 91
Moreover, the United States, British, French, and German governments had made pronouncements at the outbreak of the war acknowledging the rules against attacks on civilian populations and
unfortified cities. 92 Other evidence suggesting that the parties considered themselves bound by conventional and customary humanitarian
laws is found in government documents revealing that the Nazis, for
example, attempted to justify denunciation or suspension of their
duties. The German legal advisors responded that denunciation of
Convention obligations was not possible during the conflict, and that
even if such were possible, the "essentially identical customary laws
of war" still applied. 93 A further indication that the direct civilian
attacks were not norm-invalidating, but rather bald violations of
international law, is the fact that the British leadership worked dil94
igently to disguise deliberate decisions to target civilian populations.
With such clear indications of recognition of norms against terror
bombardment, one may reasonably question why the violations were

89See, e.g., Nardin, supra note 60, at 449 (alluding to Wasserstrom, supra note
69, as "too willing to accept, as evidence of law, practices-such as the bombing
of German and Japanese cities in World War II"). Examples of civilian bombardment
are the German attacks on London, the allied attacks on German cities, and the
dropping of atomic bombs by the United States on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. See
Roling, supra note 74, at 143. See generally Carnahan, The Law of Air Bombardment
in Its Historical Context, 17 A.F. L. Rv. 39 (Summer 1975).
10 T. FARER, supra note 15, at 9.
9, Id. at 8.
92

F.

KALSHOVEN,

supra note 75, at 36-37.

91T. FAIER, supra note 15, at 8-9.
94 Nardin, supra note 60, at 449 & n.18 (citing C. WEBSTER & N.

THEe

STRATEGiC
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OnFENsrvE AGAINST GERMANY,

1939-1945 (1961)).
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not redressed at Nuremberg. 95 Some commentators have suggested
that the mutual violations of particular laws of armed conflict rendered the norms invalid, but the failure to convict at Nuremberg is
better explained on other grounds.
A useful example for analysis is the sinking of merchant ships by
submarines with neither warning nor provision for passenger safety
after attack. As in the case of terror bombardments, these acts were
carried out by both sides during World War II. Because the Nuremberg Tribunal declined to convict a German naval officer, Admiral
Karl Donitz, for these alleged violations, some commentators have
suggested that the Tribunal perceived the rules against attacks on
merchant ships as invalid because of widespread violations. 96 However,
even if one accepts the fact that mutual violations led to the Donitz
result, it does not necessarily follow that the principles were not
thereby invalidated. Employing a line of reasoning likened to equity,
some authors have explained the result by the principle tu quoque,
that a state which has violated a particular rule may not prosecute
an enemy for similar violations. 97 This procedural approach, akin to
reciprocity, is quite different from the assertion that mutual violations
invalidate the rules of armed conflict. On the contrary, many authorities believe that by just such examples of evenhandedness at
Nuremberg (unlike the Versailles peace following World War I), "the
Allies succeeded in confirming the viability of laws that, farther down

"I "[C]ivilian targeting was not among the crimes charged against the Nuremberg
. . ." T. FARER, supra note 15, at 27. The Tribunal did, however, hold
that the general principles of the Hague Convention "had passed into general
defendants .

international law." See Solf, supra note 3, at 123 & n.41 (citing the papers of the

International Military Tribunal).
E.g., T.

TAYLOR,

supra note 39, at 36-38, suggesting Nuremberg's refusal to

hold Germany accountable for violations meant "that the London [Treaty of 1930]
rescue requirements were no longer an effective part of naval warfare, because they
had been abrogated by the practice of the belligerents on both sides under the stress
of military necessity." See also Parks, The 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Convention
of 1949, 31 NAVAL WAR C. REv., Nov. 1978, at 17, 25 & n.20 (citing the London

Treaty of 1930, the instruments of accession by the axis and allied powers, and the
finding at Nuremberg that the limitations had not been followed by any party during

World War II).

97 See F. KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERENT REPRIsALs 364 (1971); Nardin, supra note 60,
at 449. See generally T. FARER, supra note 15, at 11 (quoting the Judgment of the
Nuremberg Tribunal in its decision not to include grounds of "breaches of the

international law of submarine warfare" in assessing the sentence of Admiral Karl
Donitz because of clear indications of similar acts by the British and American
military leaders).
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the twisted corridors of history, they might encounter from the other
side of the dock." 98
A more compelling explanation for the Donitz result, consistent
with the foregoing conclusion that the World War II experience did
not nullify the rules, is that attacked Allied merchant ships had, by
their actions, lost the protection of international law. Specifically,
neither the London Naval Treaty of 1930 nor customary international
law extended protection to merchant ships, whether armed or not,
which participated in the war effort. After extensive analysis, Professor Mallison concluded that, to a considerable degree, merchant
ships on both sides had lost the immunity from attack accorded by
international law and, as a consequence, "there was not consistent
violation of the Protocol by any of the major naval belligerents
during the Second World War." 99
Those who claim that the Nuremberg inaction on terror bombing
deflated the norms against such acts find their arguments further
weakened by the results of post-War bombing surveys. By most
accounts, the attacks on civilians in both the European and Asian
theatres were militarily ineffective in two senses. 100 First, considering
the huge amount of explosives expended, the civilian bombings were
woefully inefficient.101 Given limited resources, expending firepower
on noncombatants was per se inefficient. Such actions depleted the
power that could otherwise have been used against the enemy's armed
forces.10 2 Moreover, so-called "morale" bombing actually proved
counterproductive. Studies showed "the enemy civilian population
being strengthened rather than broken in its morale by the ruthless
methods employed against it." 13

91T. FARER, supra note 15, at 11-12. Farer believes the Allies established a
precedent supporting the norms by refusing to prosecute the Germans for violations

of rules that the Allies also violated. Id.
9 W.T. Mallison, Studies in the Law of Naval Warfare: Submarines in General
and Limited Wars 75-121 (U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies, 1966).

,00
See F. KALSHOVEN, supra note 75, at 40-41; Roling, supra note 74, at 144;
Carnahan, supra note 89, at 50-51.
,0,
Roling, supra note 74, at 144 (citing the costliness and inefficiency of Nazi V1 and V-2 missile attacks on England).
0 "[Elven if these [attacks on civilians] would have the desired effect, the attacker
would still be up against the armed forces." F. KALSHOVEN, supra note 75, at 40.
103Id. at 41; accord R. MOFFIT, supra note 14, at 21 (quoting Kunz, The Laws
of War, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 316 (1956) to the effect that indiscriminate bombing
strengthened civilians' will to resist and lengthened the war). In terms of the values
of the international community, there is further persuasive indication that terror
bombardment violations did not destroy the norms against that practice. The British
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Although the 1949 Civilians Convention did not directly address
terror bombing, the principles of civilian immunity and respect for the
human person are woven through the Convention and are particularly
evident in several provisions that complement customary law and the
1907 Hague principles. Articles 27 through 34 provide extensive protection for persons in occupied territories. In fact, Article 33 prohibits
"all measures of intimidation or of terrorism."'0 Many authorities
believe that these articles apply broadly to territories of parties to the
conflict, as well as to occupied territory.0 5 Moreover, Article 18 states
that civilian hospitals, if used for the proper humanitarian purpose,
"may in no circumstances be the object of attack."' 6
In summation, not only were norms against civilian targeting and
indiscriminate attacks firmly established in the pre-World War II
conventional and customary humanitarian law, the norms also survived the World War II experience and continued to reflect the values
of the world community as codified in the Civilians Convention. The
law of armed conflict was not seriously invoked as justification for
the violative attacks. In fact, the Nuremberg Tribunal strengthened,
rather than shattered, the principles by its evenhanded treatment of
the violations. Moreover, post-War analysis of "morale" bombing
revealed that such "coercive" warfare was inefficient and counterproductive, thus removing even the kriegsraison argument that the
measures were justified as militarily useful. Finally, the Civilians
Convention reaffirmed and expanded the rules requiring respect for
civilians in warfare.
3. The Requirement of Avoiding Unreasonable Damage to
Civilian Values in Attacks on Military Objectives
Having examined general notions of civilian immunity and the
prohibitions against deliberate and indiscriminate attacks on civilian
jurist A.P.V. Rogers characterized the international response as follows: "[T]his
practice resulted in such hostile criticism after the war that it cannot be regarded
as an internationally accepted practice." Rogers, supra note 56, at 297.
-04Civilians Convention, supra note 2, arts. 27-34; see S.V. MALLISON & W.T.
MALLISON,

supra note 76, at 60.

101See, e.g., S.V. MALLISON & W.T. MALLISON, supra note 76, at 58-59.
,06Civilians Convention, supra note 2, art. 18. Such absolute protection ceases
only when civilian hospitals "are used to commit, outside their humanitarian duties,
acts harmful to the enemy." Even in such circumstances, there must be a warning,
unheeded after a reasonable time, before attack can ensue. Id., art. 19.
Other Civilians Convention provisions in Part II providing for respect for civilian
immunity are Articles 14 and 15, establishing safe refuges and hospital and safety
zones for particularly vulnerable classes of civilians. See Solf, supra note 3, at 12627.
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targets, the inquiry turns to the second factual scenario: civilian
damage caused by attacks on military objectives.
a.

The Concept of Military Objective

Implicit in the "military objective" principle is the reality that,
although civilian values are to be spared, military targets may be
attacked. However, the amorphous notion of "military objective"
has proved difficult to define in the traditional humanitarian law.
Some extremists advance the strained reasoning that even civilians in
their homes constitute a military objective because of the need to
make life generally unpleasant for the enemy.' °7 The Hague Draft
Rules on Air Warfare of 1923 (the Hague Draft) provide some
elucidation of the meaning of military objective. The Hague Draft
indicated that the following non-battlefield objects were lawful targets:
military works, establishments or depots; factories engaged in the
manufacture of arms, ammunition or distinctively military supplies;
and lines of communication or transportation used for military purposes. 10
Indicative of the wide acceptance of the "military objective" principle is the fact that the principle has long been incorporated into
the warfare manuals of the United States armed forces.' °9 Although
widely accepted, the military objective principle tends to be interpreted
broadly. Some belligerents regard as "legitimate targets not only
strictly military objectives, but also those which are likely to serve,
directly or indirectly, the war effort of the enemy, that is, objectives
which by their nature are not intended for military purposes but

,07See supra note 88 and accompanying text; see also Rogers, supra note 56, at
297.
108 Hague Rules of Air Warfare of 1923, art. 24, reprintedin SCHINDLER & ToMAN,
supra note 2, at 150.
,09See, e.g., 1956 U.S. ARmy MANUAL, supra note 67, at para. 40c (Change No.
1, 1976):
Military Objectives-i.e.,

combatants, and those objects which by their

nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to military
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in
the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantageare permissible objects of attack (including bombardment). Military objectives include, for example, factories producing munitions and military supplies, military camps, warehouses storing munitions and military supplies,
ports and railroads being used for the transportation of military supplies,

and other places that are for the accommodation of troops or the support
of military operations.
Id.; see also Air Force Pamphlet, supra note 56, para. 5-3b.

30
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which may acquire great importance for armies in the event of war."' 0
Therefore, the military objective limitation, absent further restraints,
often provides civilians little protection from war's ravages.
b. HumanitarianLaw Restraints on Attacks Against Military
Objectives
Through the foundational concepts of military necessity and humanity, the traditional humanitarian law imposes limits on a belligerent's actions against military objectives. The guiding principle is
that, in attacking military objectives, any unreasonable damage to
civilian values shall be avoided."' The abstract "unreasonable" limitation derives some clarity from two additional humanitarian law
precepts: the prohibition against unnecessary damage and the rule of
proportionality.
Basic humanitarian law demands that belligerents take measures
to avoid civilian damage when such measures result in no loss of
military advantage." 2 Thus, combatants must take all possible precautions to spare civilians and civilian objects in the area of military
targets. For example, Hague law requires a commander to do everything in his power to warn authorities of an impending attack so
that civilians may leave the area of the military objective." 3 Moreover,
as shown above, international law proscribes indiscriminate "area"
attacks on zones containing scattered military targets in populous
regions. "14

Long regarded as a cornerstone of humanitarian law is the customary principle of proportionality. The principle postulates that there
must be a reasonable relationship between the lawful destructiveness
of measures and the ancillary or collateral effects." 5 Accordingly,
incidental loss of life and damage to property must not be excessive
relative to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be

110Cassese, supra note 80, at 83.

" See F. KALSHOVEN, supra note 75, at 61, 66.
See id. at 66. See generally MALLISON & MALLISON, TnE PALESTINE PROBLEM,
supra note 54, at 376 & n.350 (referencing the legal principle of humanity and the
112

military principle of economy of force, and citing Air Force regulations incorporating
the prohibition against unnecessary destruction).

- 1907 Hague Convention IV, supra note 3, art. 26. See also the United States
Air Force's treatment of the duty to take precautions in Air Force Pamphlet, supra
note 56, para. 5-3c (stating the requirement of advance warning when circumstances
permit and listing several additional "Precautions Required'! in planning attacks).
114 See supra notes 85-103 and accompanying text.
"' MALLISON & MALLISON, THE PALESTINE PROBLEM, supra note 54, at 377.
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gained. 1 16 The principle was codified by the 1974-1977 Geneva Conference;"' it has been called the "very nub of the rule of armed
conflict" and has sturdy underpinnings in the Lieber Code and Martens Clause.' 18
With the foregoing development of traditional humanitarian law
concepts concerning civilian protection in mind, the particular problem of civilian starvation and relief under that regime of law will be
considered.
C. Starvation and Relief in TraditionalHumanitarian Law
1.

Historical Background

Acts directed at starvation of people, including the impediment of
relief efforts on behalf of starving populations, have long roots in
the history of warfare. Speaking during the tragic Nigerian conflict,
the British Foreign Secretary stated that "[w]e must accept that, in
the whole history of warfare, any nation which has been in a position
to starve its enemy out has done so."" 9
Although starvation of civilians is said to have been used in warfare
since pre-history, the record of examples in 19th and 20th century
warfare provides the most revealing glimpses of rationalizations for
the practice. During the United States Civil War, the blockade of
the South and destruction of railroad lines were directed in part at
starving the Confederacy. Moreover, Union troops deliberately destroyed foodstuffs and farm machinery to "weaken the South and
bring the Confederacy to surrender."'

20

As Sherman said, "We are

,,6
This formulation of the principle is found in 1956 U.S. ARMY MANuAL, supra
note 67, para. 41. See also Air Force Pamphlet, supra note 56, para. 5-3b(1). This
standard would not allow, for example, destruction of a village simply because there
were localized nests of resistance in it. Cassese, supra note 80, at 85 & n. 142 (drawing
on a 1961 West German Military Manual for the example).
1,7 Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 51, 57. See Cassese, supra note 80, at 95 (with
citation to statement of the U.S. delegation during the negotiation of the Protocols).
,, Rogers, supra note 56, at 294-95, 297.
", Rosenblad, supra note
12, at 253. The distinction between combatants and
civilians, although often difficult to draw, is important to keep in mind during the
analysis. Starvation of combatants to force their capitulation not only has been used
in warfare throughout recorded history but also has been accepted under the rubric
of military necessity. See supra note 12 and accompany text. See generally Mudge,
supra note 14, at 234 (with citations to treatises enunciating the justification for
starvation of combatants). The focus here, therefore, is on actions directed at civilians
and those which impact civilians by virtue of incidental effects.
110Mudge, supra note 14, at 240 (quoting P. GATES, AGRICULTURE AND THE CIViL
WAR 92-94 (1965)).
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not only fighting hostile armies but a hostile people," who must be
made to "feel the hard hand of war . . "121 In the conflict with
China in 1885, France barred shipments of rice as contraband of
war and justified the action by pointing to the importance of rice
in feeding the Chinese population. Bismarck, whose successful sieges
of Metz and Paris in 1870 were accomplished partly by starvation
of civilians, reportedly approved of the French measure against China,
as it had "for its object the shortening of the war by increasing the
' 122
difficulty of the enemy.'
Despite earlier protests of others' blockades of foodstuffs as contraband, Great Britain treated food destined for Germany in World
Wars I and II in the same manner, even though Britain knew that
the blockades were causing starvation among civilians. The British
justified the blockades by pointing out the difficulty of distinguishing
between military and civilian recipients and the integration of civilians
into the war-making effort. 123 In World War II, the Nazis made tragic
use of denial of foodstuffs. Reportedly, during the 900-day Nazi
siege of Leningrad, more than one million Russians died of starvation. 24 Finally, starvation and denial of relief have remained ugly
parts of war in a number of post-World War II conflicts, perhaps
25
most notably in Biafra.1
2. Development of InternationalLegal Norms Regarding
Starvation and Relief
Despite the tragic examples of civilian starvation in warfare, the
traditional humanitarian law has not suffered those practices to occur
with its imprimatur. In fact, the act of intentional starvation is
analogous to that of terror bombardment, with a great deal of
confusion resulting from eagerness to equate violations with the non-

,21B. HART, SHERMAN: SOLDIER, REALIST, AMERicAN 358 (1958).
122Mudge, supra note 14, at 238 (citing 2 J. GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW
THE WORLD WAR

AND

337 (1920)).

121 Mudge, supra note 14,
at 241, 248-50. Mudge's article provides interesting
historical background on the practice. He concludes that proponents of starvation

of civilians rest their justification on two assumptions: (1) it is impossible to distinguish between combatants and civilians; and, (2) even if such a distinction exists,
the onus is on the blockaded government to choose between feeding its civilians and
sustaining the military effort. Id. at 251.
124 Rosenblad, supra note 12, at 255 (citing A. WYKEs, THE SIEGE OF LENINGRAD:
EPic OF SURVIVAL 144 (1969)).
121

See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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existence or invalidation of norms, or with the existence of counternorms. 126
Commentators have been quick to find a norm allowing starvation
of civilians by reference to history's tragic examples of such starvation,
and to Article 17 of the Lieber Code which provides that "[w]ar is
not carried on by arms alone. It is lawful to starve the hostile
belligerent, armed or unarmed, so that it leads to the speedier subjection of the enemy.' 1 27 Paradoxically (and inaccurately, it is suggested), the work frequently credited as the foundation of modern
humanitarian law is saddled with responsibility for justifying the
cruelty of civilian starvation in 19th and 20th century armed conflict.
A closer look at Lieber's work reveals that Article 17 was not
intended, even at the time of its writing, to give commanders carte
blanche to starve civilians, to say nothing of the impact of the many
conventional and customary humanitarian law developments that have
affected the starvation issue since that time. First, the provision
includes reference to military necessity in stating that the practice is
justified when "it leads to the speedier subjection of the enemy."
Accordingly, commanders such as Sherman who carried out wanton
and unnecessary destruction of foodstuffs would not be vindicated
by the provision.128 Even more important, however, the reference to
military necessity brings into the assessment other Lieber Code provisions on the issue. 29 Significantly, Lieber is often credited with

126
127

See supra notes 69-72 & 89 and accompanying text.
Lieber Code, supra note 62, art. 17. For the view that this Lieber Code article

reflects customary international law at the time, see M. BOTI-E, K. PARTSCH & W.
SOLF, NEW

RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS:

COMMENTARY

ON TILE Two

1977 PROTOCOLs ADDITIONAL TO TIE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 336 (1982).

See also Solf, supra note 3, at 133 (suggesting that civilian starvation remains
permissible under customary international law, citing Lieber Code Article 17).
,28
Regarding the contention that Lieber did not intend to provide justification
for such acts, see infra note 135 and accompanying text.
129 Among the qualifications of the military necessity principle in the Lieber Code
are the following: (1) Measures must not only be "indispensable for securing the
ends of the war" but also "lawful according to the modern law and usages of war."

Lieber Code, art. 14. (2) Inclusion of the following famous language evidencing the
humanity principle following a partial list of measures that may be included in the
military necessity rubric: "Men who take up arms against one another in public war
do not cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible to one another and
to God." Id., art. 15. (3) Additional explication of how humanity tempers military
necessity: "Military necessity does not admit of cruelty-that is, the infliction of
suffering for the sake of suffering or revenge ... nor of the wanton devastation
of a district ... military necessity does not include any act of hostility which makes

the return to peace unnecessarily difficult." Id., art. 16.
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enunciation of the narrow view of military necessity by virtue of his
adding to the definition of military necessity the phrase "and which
are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war."' 30
Moreover, the Lieber Code includes affirmation of several key principles of humanitarian law that circumscribe military necessity, including clear references to the principle of humanity and the principle
of distinction.' Therefore, after analysis of Article 17 in the context
of the entire Lieber Code, the justification for civilian starvation is
narrowed considerably.
The environment and manner in which Lieber wrote and obtained
acceptance of his Code sheds further light on the matter. Although
the Code turned out to be "almost entirely sound international law
at the core",' 13 2 Lieber had a difficult time gathering support for his
project. When he finally persuaded Henry Wager Halleck, Generalin-Chief of the Union Armies, to sponsor his work, the initial charter
was to produce a set of regulations to make the Union Army a more
efficient fighting machine. Although the focus changed to providing
a draft revision and systemization of the rules governing land warfare,
the fact remains that Lieber knew his Code required the imprimatur
of Union generals before it would have any effect.'
Accordingly,
the resulting work was "an admixture of military sternness with basic
humanitarianism."

34

Perhaps Lieber believed that he needed to permit

the contemplation of civilian starvation under certain circumstances
in order to win approval of the work as a whole and assure its lasting

130

See supra note 62 and accompanying text.

13 See supra note 129 for examples of the humanity principle in the Lieber Code.

On distinction, the Code provides:

[A]s civilization has advanced . . .so has likewise advanced the distinction
between the private individual belonging to a hostile country and the hostile
country itself, with its men in arms. The principle has been more and more
acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property,
and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit.
Lieber Code, supra note 62, art. 22.
Lieber's words are widely credited with persuasively affirming the distinction
principle, resulting in similar characterizations in virtually all subsequent instruments.
See MALLISON & MALLISON, TIE PALESTINE PROBLEM, supra note 54, at 357; R.
HARTIGAN, supra note 62, at 23 (stating that "the echo of Lieber is clear and
distinct", after quoting at length language from the Civilians Convention on the
distinction principle).
132 F. FREIDEL, LIEBER 335 (1951).
"3 On the events leading up to promulgation of the LieberCode, and particularly
the persistent efforts of Lieber to persuade Halleck that the project was worthy and
necessary, see generally R. HARTIGAN, supra note 62, at 13-15.
134F. FREIDEL, supra note 132, at 335.
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humanitarian legacy. Support for the contention that Lieber opposed
unmitigated destruction is found in his letter to Halleck imploring
him to issue specific orders, referencing the Code, to stop the "devastation" and "wanton destruction" of private property:
It does incalculable injury. It demoralizes our troops, it annihilates
wealth irrevocably and makes a return to a state of peace and
peaceful minds more and more difficult. Your order, though impressive, and even sharp, might be written, with reference to the
Code, and pointing out the disastrous consequences of reckless
devastation, in a manner that it might not furnish our reckless
135
enemy with new arguments for his savagery.
The early perspectives of Lieber and others on the starvation issue
must be viewed in the larger humanitarian law context. Thus, an
unmitigated starvation strategy must be seen not only as violative of
the Lieber Code based on the foregoing reasoning, but also as conflicting with the minimum requirement of military necessity: no Carthaginian peace. 3 6 Consequently, even under early humanitarian law
formulations, there is little to support an expansive right to starve
civilians in contravention of the position that accords due regard to
principles of humanity (such as distinction) and to the restraints
37
inherent in the principle of military necessity.
The 1907 Hague Convention IV perpetuated the principle that
destruction of enemy property, including items of sustenance, might
be justified during armed conflict, but with clear reference to the
military necessity limitation: "[I]t is especially forbidden . .. to destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure
be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war."' 3 8 Although the
Convention embraced the crucial principles of humanity to temper
military necessity, 13 9 no special protection for civilian items of sus-

"I Letter from Francis Lieber to General Henry W. Halleck (May 20, 1863)
reprinted in R. HARTIGAN, supra note 62, at 108-09.
136 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. Accord T. FARER, supra note 15,

at 20.
,17
For a discussion of limits on the concept of military necessity in traditional
humanitarian law, see supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text .
38
139

1907 Hague Convention IV, supra note 3, art. 23(g). See also supra note 65.
1907 Hague Convention IV, supra note 3. The 1907 Hague Convention IV

advanced, inter alia, the following principles of humanity: the notion that the right
"to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited" (Article 22); nonderogable
prohibitions such as those against treachery, harming prisoners, and the refusal of
quarter (Article 23(b)-(d)); the prohibition against bombardment of undefended places
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tenance, nor any direct prohibition of starvation as a method of
warfare, was articulated in the "law of the Hague."
Despite the starvation practices of World Wars I and II, there are
indications that some parties considered the practice questionable, if
not prohibited, under international law. Consequently, to rationalize
these measures, actors resorted to expansive interpretations of military
necessity rather than claiming that civilian starvation was allowable
per se.140 For example, the orders of desperate Nazi leaders suspending
the laws of war included the declaration that the "supply of food
to local inhabitants and prisoners of war is unnecessary humanitarianism.' ' 41 Thus, the tragic acts of deprivation and starvation in
Russia were not carried out under some colorable legal justification.
On the contrary, they were undertaken pursuant to the unlawful
suspension of international humanitarian norms prohibiting such practices.
Further reflections of the norms perceived by the belligerents in
World War II are discernible from their views on blockade and
contraband. The London Declaration of 1909, although unratified,
was an attempt to settle the status of foodstuffs by stating the
customary rule that the items should be treated as conditional contraband (with free passage allowed if intended exclusively for the
civilian population), and by providing conditions under which they
would be .subject to seizure. 142 Although this approach gave rise to
severe resfrictions on food consignments due to claims of impossibility
of distinction, the principle nevertheless incorporated a duty to consider civilian values. Such a duty is reflected in the expression of
disapproval by the Soviet Union of the harsh British refusal to attempt
to distinguish between provisions for the civilian population and those

(Article 25); the requirement of taking precautions such as warning civilians of
impending attack (Article 26); and the Martens Clause, with direct reference to the
"laws of humanity" and "the dictates of the public conscience" (Preamble). On
these matters of Hague Law see supra notes 55, 59, 65, 79, 82, & 113 and accompanying text.
,40 An example is the British pronouncements during both World Wars to the
effect that civilian deprivation was militarily necessary because Germany would, as
a result, have the option to reduce its war effort to reduce civilian starvation. See
generally Beveridge, Blockade and the Civilian Population, PAMPHLETS ON WORLD
AFFAIRs, No. 24, at 26-27, 31 (1940) (providing British Government positions supporting civilian starvation), quoted in Mudge, supra note 14, at 242 n.50, 250-51.
141

See T.

FARER,

supra note 15, at 8; T.

TAYLOR,

supra note 39, at 26. See also

supra text accompanying note 93.
142 Declaration Concerning the Laws of Naval Warfare,
Feb. 26, 1909, arts. 24,
33-36, reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 2, at 757.
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for the armed forces of Germany. 43' In a note of October 25, 1939,
the Soviet Union protested against the British position on humanitarian grounds:
It is known that the universally recognized principles of international
law do not permit the air bombardment of the peaceful population,
women, children, and aged people.
On the same grounds the Soviet Government deem it not permissable
[sic] to deprive the peaceful population of foodstuffs, fuel, and
clothing, and thus subject children, women, and aged people and
invalids to every hardship and starvation by proclaiming the goods
of popular consumption as war contraband.'"
Thus, although a detailed treatment of these issues is beyond the
scope of this inquiry, there is evidence that the participants in World
War II considered the international law governing blockade and
contraband as a restraint on the imposition of measures to deprive
enemy civilians of sustenance.
Even though the devastating blockades and sieges of World War
II were not addressed at Nuremberg, the War Crimes Tribunals did
treat issues related to the applicability of Hague law to the destruction
of items of sustenance. First, of general importance, the International
Military Tribunal held that the Hague Convention had passed into
customary international law and thus could be applied to Germany
despite Nazi-defendant protestations.' 45 Regarding the retreating Nazis' devastation of Norway to frustrate pursuit, the court held that
such action would be lawful under Article 23(g) of the 1907 Hague
Convention IV if supported by the defendant's honest belief that
under the circumstances the necessities of war required the destruction.
Moreover, there was a suggestion that a besieging force's action to
drive back civilians being evacuated by the besieged (to lessen logistical
burdens) might be a lawful, although an extreme, measure.' 46 In sum,
in the wake of the Nuremberg cases Hague law was acknowledged
as clearly binding in most particulars, although limited because it
provided few special protections against starvation of civilians in

141

See supra note 140.

- This diplomatic protest is quoted in Beveridge, supra note 140, at 5, and in
Mudge, supra note 14, at 250.
1411 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALs BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL 253-54 (1954).
14

United States v. Von Leeb (The High Command Case), reprinted in 11 TRIALS

OF WAR CRIMINALs

BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNAL

BOTHE, K. PARTSCH & W. SOLF, supra note 127, at 337.

(1950). See M.

[Vol. 19:1

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

general and devastation of the population's objects of sustenance in
particular.
Despite the Nuremberg holdings that buttressed Hague principles,
the excesses of war and frequent violations of law seen in World
Wars I and II provided the 1949 Geneva Conference ample motivation
to affirm conventional and customary humanitarian law principles
and to provide more meaningful civilian protections. The Geneva
Civilians Convention of 1949 succeeded in codifying many salutary
47
developments in the protection of civilians during armed conflict,1
but its provisions did not substantially alter the law to afford special
protection for items of sustenance for the civilian population. For
example, the Civilians Convention did not deal in any significant
way with methods and means of warfare. 148 Moreover, although it
stated that derogation from the general prohibition against destruction
of enemy property must be "absolutely necessary by military operations," this provision was not viewed as a material change to the
correlative principle in the 1907 Hague Convention IV.

149

Among the many humanitarian contributions of the Civilians Convention were the extensive obligations imposed on occupying powers
for the proper treatment of civilians in occupied territory. Consequently, the Convention marked a most welcome improvement in the
law to provide special protection of civilian sustenance items at least
under the limited circumstances of occupation. The Civilians Convention provides that the occupying power is required to ensure the
adequate supply of food, medical supplies, and clothing for the
civilian population and to arrange for relief action to meet shortages. 150 Thus, in the light of these expansive obligations and the
subsequent wide accession to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the traditional humanitarian law can be viewed as effectively addressing

141

Civilians Convention, supra note 2. See 4 INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE

RED CROSS,

COMMENTARY

ON

GENEVA

CONVENTION

RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION

OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TmE OF WAR (J. Pictet ed. 1958) (known as the seminal

analysis of the Civilians Convention).
148 Mudge, supra note
14, at 251 (quoting Kunz, The Laws of War, 50 AM. J.
INT'L L. 323 (1956)).
149 Civilians Convention, supra note 2, art. 53.
Indeed, three appears to be little
substantive distinction among the respective military necessity passages of the Lieber
Code ("indispensable"), the 1907 Hague Convention IV ("imperatively demanded"),
and the Civilians Convention ("absolutely necessary").
110Civilians Convention, supra note 2, arts. 55, 59-61. See M. BOTHE, K. PARTSCH
& W. SOLF, supra note 127, at 337.
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most issues of civilian starvation and relief as regards occupied territory.
Regarding nonoccupied territory, the pre-1949 legal order provided
civilians with protection from starvation tactics mainly in the oftviolated warfare limitations inherent in the principles of military
necessity and distinction. The Civilians Convention, however, added
two specific protections. First, the rules on sieges were refined to
require parties to attempt to conclude local agreements for evacuation
of "wounded, sick, infirm, and aged persons, children and maternity
cases." 5 ' Moreover, in what appears to have been an attempt to
deflate the excuse of impossibility of distinction between combatants
and civilians, the Convention encouraged relief to those who have
been termed "useless mouths",' 2 by requiring parties to allow passage
of "consignments of essential foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended
for children under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity cases."
This beneficial provision, however, also contains expansive derogations. Specifically, passage is conditioned on the besieging party being
"satisfied there are no reasons for fearing" diversion, ineffective
control, or some "definite advantage" inuring to the besieged (for
example, enabling the besieged to reallocate productive assets to
"military efforts") by virtue of receiving such relief.' Although the
exceptions appear to swallow the rule, the provision formed a "clearly
worded moral obligation"' 5 4 and thus represented at least a nod
towards special protection for civilians in nonoccupied areas against
measures to deprive them of needed sustenance during armed conflict.
Civilian protections during warfare, both generally and in the particular area of starvation and relief, are firmly grounded in the
traditional humanitarian law as it developed through the time of the

Civilians Convention, supra note 2, art. 17.
,52
Professor Solf used the term "useless mouths," to describe those generally
incapable of assisting the war effort, in a discussion with the author. Telephone
interview with Waldemar A. Solf, Adjunct Professor of Law, Washington College
of Law, The American University (Mar. 30, 1987). Subsequently, the term was
encountered in other sources. While the term seems derogatory, it is paradoxically
instructive-for "useless" in the sense of "useless militarily" tends to focus attention
not only on the illegality (under the military necessity principle) but also on the
absurdity of indiscriminate starvation measures during armed conflict. I Civilians Convention, supra note 2, art. 23. See also P. MAcALISTER-SMITH,
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE:
TIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 22 (1985).

DISASTER RELIEF ACTIONS IN INTERNA-

"I Mudge, supra note 14, at 253 (with citation to the negotiating history of the

Civilians Convention).
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1949 Geneva Conference. Restraints on measures affecting civilians
are inherent in the very foundations of humanitarian law: the principles of military necessity and humanity. Moreover, the distinction
principle and its progeny of tenets aimed at protecting civilians have
long roots in the conventional and customary law. Despite the tendency to confuse validity of and compliance with norms, the crucial
humanitarian law principles survived, through widely accepted treaty
refinements and the willingness of national governments to declare
the principles and to incorporate them in military manuals. Moreover,
in the international forum of Nuremberg, the crucial principles were
confirmed as valid and binding on nations. Finally, the Civilians
Convention added a number of special protections, particularly regarding occupied territories, that strengthened the general principles
and removed some specious justifications that had been used for
savagery in warfare. Thus, the humanitarian law of 1949 explicitly
and implicitly prohibited measures directed at civilians and paved the
way for further development and reaffirmation of the law to benefit
innocents during armed conflicts.
III.

THE

IMPACT OF THE POST-WAR EXPERIENCE: HUMANITARIAN

LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS ADVANCES

The post-World War II period has brought momentous changes in
the international legal order, and many of these changes have touched
the humanitarian law of armed conflict. First to be examined are
developments in the evolution and affirmation of the humanitarian
law as such, including the growing public outrage over the excesses
of war and the influence of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, as well
as the nature of international lawmaking in the post-War, United
Nations era. The focus in this latter area will be on changes in the
international legal order accompanying the vast increase in the number
of international participants and the rise of the United Nations as a
forum for the refinement and expression of international consensus.
This discussion will set the stage for treatment of several crucial
advances in the world legal order that are significant in an evaluation
of modern civilian protections during armed conflict. Under the broad
category of "human rights," the nonderogable right to life and the
prohibition against genocide will be examined in some depth. Finally,
the inquiry will consider the increase in respect for civilian values
inherent in the emerging rights to food and humanitarian assistance
and the frequent reaffirmation of the distinction principle.
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HumanitarianLaw in the Post-War Era

Almost thirty years elapsed between the signing of the Geneva
Conventions and the next multilateral conference on humanitarian
law, the 1974-77 Geneva Conference that yielded Protocols I and II.
Despite this hiatus, there is ample support for the contention that
considerable development of principles of civilian protection occurred
in the interim.
1.

The Important Role of Public Opinion

Public exposure to the ravages of war has increased markedly as
the world community has drawn closer together through greater association and interdependence among nations and through advances
in mass communications. As a result, public awareness of, and concern about, the suffering attending many recent armed conflicts has
grown substantially. Public opinion, "a most potent force," '5 5 has
swung markedly to the "humanity" interest as tragic hostilities are
vividly displayed.
The importance of public opinion is apparent in the post-War
experience of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
as it sought to bring states together to fill gaps in the 1949 Conventions
regarding civilian protections and to update the 1907 Hague rules
limiting methods of warfare. 5 6 Despite persistent ICRC attempts since
1956 to arouse interest in the formulation of a new humanitarian
law instrument, it was not until 1974 that conferees convened towards
this end, after "the wars of the Sixties (Viet Nam, Nigeria, Bangladesh, and the Middle East) and decolonization [brought about] a
real interest in the reaffirmation and development of international
humanitarian law."' 5 7 Moreover, the imprint of those wars on the
T. MERON, supra note 35, at 164.
For brief overviews of the activities of the ICRC in this period and the events
leading up to the 1974-77 Geneva Diplomatic Conference, see Levie, supra note 3,
at 371-73; Parks, supra note 96, at 17.
,17Gasser, A Brief Analysis of the 1977 Geneva Protocols, 19 AKRON L. REV.
525, 525 (1986).
The preliminary ICRC draft of 1956 received only polite response. See generally
Levie, supra note 3, at 370, n.10 ("The ICRC presented these Draft Rules to the
International Conference of the Red Cross in New Delhi in 1957 only to have them
approved by an innocuous resolution which was a death blow."). The United States
was, Ambassador Aldrich candidly admitted, "very reluctant" to consider negotiations to expand protections relating to "aerial bombardment, the protection of the
civilian population, and the conduct of military operations. I think it was only the
experience in Vietnam that brought it around to the view that not only was it timely
55
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public conscience continued to play a dominant role throughout the
proceedings. As stated by Ambassador Aldrich, the head of the United
States Delegation, many key themes of Protocol I, such as the extensive treatment of civilian protection,
can only be understood in light of the sad experiences of the world
in the last 20 years in dealing with international armed conflicts.
Virtually every issue discussed .

.

. had its origins in the conflicts

in the Middle East, Korea, Southeast Asia or elsewhere in the world.
For each of the proposals that were pressed, there were experiences
that were relevant.

58

Two other examples illustrate the important role of public opinion
in shaping community values regarding humanitarian law. First, the
shocking excesses of World War II translated into world consensus
after the war to change the international legal order, resulting in the
birth of the United Nations and the modern human rights movement.
As Professor Sohn stated:
When humanity recovered in 1945 from the double trauma of millions having been killed by the German holocaust and the Second
World War, the Members of the United Nations promised both "to
save mankind from the scourge of war" and to promote "universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all"

.

. .

. In the years that followed, the United

Nations defined with increasing precision the rights to be protected,
first in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the modern
magna carta ....

119

Moreover, the 1949 Geneva Conference "dealt mainly with abuses
committed . . . during World War II." 60

to get into these negotiations, but it was in fact necessary." Aldrich, Protocols

Additional to the Geneva Conventions on the Laws of War, 1980 AM. Soc'Y
L.

INT'L

191, 192 [hereinafter Aldrich, Protocols].
A development which reflected the gathering impetus for a conference, and which
triggered greater support for further ICRC preparatory work, was the United Nations
Resolution 2444 of 1968. Adopted unanimously, the Resolution encouraged UN/
ICRC study of "the need for additional humanitarian law conventions" and affirmed
the "absolute prohibition of attacks on the civilian populations as such." G.A. Res.
2444, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968).
158Aldrich, Protocols, supra note 157, at 191-92.
-9 Sohn, Fundamental Guarantees, supra note 30, at 1.
-0 Carnahan, supra note 9, at 32.
Retrospective examination of anti-civilian practices during World War II has helped
reaffirm the importance of the distinction principle. For example, the position of
some during World War II that it was "legitimate to attack civilian morale" has
PROC.
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The second, more recent example of the effect of public opinion
on the formation of community values in humanitarian law comes
from the Beirut sieges of early 1987.161 Despite the fervor and resolve
of the besieging Amal forces over several months, the situation began
to change rapidly after Dr. Pauline Cutting, a British physician inside
a besieged camp, succeeded in alerting the international press of the
hardships being caused by the siege. Consequently, after a few days
of coverage, it was reported: "[Slince an appeal by Cutting for relief
of the camps gained international attention, Amal has progressively
loosened its grip on them."1 62 Undeniably, public opinion has assumed
a more prominent role in the post-War period in the shaping of
values in the international legal order, and there is wide recognition
effective means of
of the importance of public support, "the most
63
1
law."
humanitarian
for
encouraging respect
2.

The Strength of the 1949 Geneva Conventions

Perhaps the most vivid evidence of post-War endorsement and
reaffirmation of humanitarian law tenets of civilian protection is the
virtual unanimous acceptance of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Some
provisions of the Conventions can be traced to earlier Geneva Conventions and the 1907 Hague Convention IV, generally accepted as
reflecting customary international law, based on holdings of the War
Crimes Tribunals.'1" Moreover, the Conventions as a whole have
achieved almost universal acceptance in the years since their signature,
with the number of parties (164) currently exceeding even the number
of State Members of the United Nations (159).165 Thus, although the
Civilians Convention can be characterized as reflective of customary

been roundly rejected in the post-War years. See supra note 103. See also supra
notes 87-89 and accompanying text. Unsurprisingly, the 1974-77 Geneva Conference
devoted considerable attention to describing the contours of "military objective."
See Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 52.
161

On the sieges and the underlying facets of the conflict between the Amal and

the Palestinians in Lebanon, see supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
162 Food Reaches Besieged Palestinian Refugees, Wash. Post, Feb. 16, 1987, at
A25, col. 1.
,63 T. MERON, supra note 35, at 160.
'64 See supra note 145 and accompanying text. See also Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East of 1948, 15 United Nations War Crimes
Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 13 (1949); Judgment of the
International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals, CMD.
6964, Misc. No. 12, at 64-65 (1946); T. MERON, supra note 35, at 6, n.16.
163 These figures are current as of August, 1986. See ICRC, Dissemination No.

5, Aug. 1986.
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humanitarian law, the principles embodied therein have even sturdier
support as binding norms because they are higher-order, treaty obligations binding on virtually every country. 16 Significantly, this includes the many new states that have emerged as colonial ties have
been broken in the post-War period.
The strength of 1949 the Geneva Conventions was underscored in
the recent decision of the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case. 167 Although both the United States and Nicaragua are
parties to the 1949 Conventions, Nicaragua did not invoke them in
the proceedings. On its own initiative, the Court referenced the "multilateral treaty reservation" of the United States but held that this
issue did not need to be decided because United States conduct could
instead be judged by fundamental principles of international law.
Specifically, the Court deemed common Articles 1 and 3 of the
Conventions as reflective of binding general principles. Commenting
on Article 3, the Court stated:
Article 3 which is common to all four Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949 defines certain rules to be applied in the armed conflicts
of a non-international character. There is no doubt that, in the
event of international armed conflicts, these rules also constitute a
minimum yardstick, in addition to the more elaborate rules which
are also to apply to international conflicts, and they are rules which,
in the Court's opinion, reflect what the Court in 1949 called "elementary considerations of humanity ....
The growing consensus that the 1949 Geneva Conventions are
declaratory of customary international law suggests a greater awareness of the Conventions' humanitarian underpinnings and of their
roots in community values. Concomitantly, the international community's expectations that the Conventions will be observed is
strengthened. Moreover, fueled by authoritative statements such as
that of the World Court in the Nicaragua case, the broadening
consensus can lead to elevation of some 1949 Convention rules to
jus cogens status.' 69 In the post-War era, more and more indications

See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgment of June 27)
(Merits).
" Id. at 114 (quoting Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. 22 (Merits)). See also T.
MERON, supra note 35, at 7-8.
69 See generally Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AM. J.
66
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show that the noble humanitarian principles of the Civilians Convention have in fact been recognized as positive law by the inter1 70

national community.

B.

InternationalLawmaking in the United Nations Era

Beyond the core process of humanitarian law development and
reaffirmation through treaties, the rise of international organizations
has greatly expanded the norm-creating process across the entire
spectrum of international legal issues in the post-War era. Most
prominently, the United Nations has added an entirely new dimension
to the creation of customary norms.
Traditional views on the establishment of customary norms focus
on state usage or practice, although no particular minimum time
period of such usage or practice is required. 17' It is also acknowledged
that some traditional norms have emerged not through consistent
state practice, but instead by declarations of principles and subsequent
indices of agreement to, or endorsement of, the concepts by the
1

international community.

72

The United Nations has embellished and quickened the customary
norm-creation process in several ways. First, the concept of "state
practice" has expanded to include not only individual state acts in
the conduct of world affairs but also expressions of individual state
views through votes and pronouncements in United Nations fora. As
Judge Tanaka stated in his dissenting opinion in the South West
Africa cases, a state now has the opportunity "to declare its position
to all members of the organization and to know immediately their
reaction on the same matter."' 73 Moreover, the United Nations has
made the collective dimension of state practice much more prominent,

L. 348, 350 & n.8 (discussing the processes of crystallization of norms and
their elevation to jus cogens status, and citing the Report of the International Law
Commission as support for recognition of certain rules of humanitarian law as jus
INT'L

cogens).
170

'

44.

Id.
See

MALLISON & MALISON, THE PALESTINE PROBLEM,

supra note 54,

at

142-

12 See, e.g., id. at 144-45 (tracing Article 9 of the Brussels Declaration of 1874
"regarding treatment of irregular combatants" as it was enunciated and became
accepted as reflective of existing law in ensuing years, even though little or no
evidence of usage or practice existed).
73 Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa, Second Phase [1966] I.C.J.
6, 248 (dissent of Judge Tanaka). Judge Tanaka's contention was that there was a
legal norm of equality that was violated by apartheid. See MALLISON & MALLISON,
THE PALESTINE PROBLEM, supra note 54, at 147-48.
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with "the number of occasions on which states see fit to act collectively . . . greatly increased by the activities of international organizations.' 1 74 Dr. Rosalyn Higgins aptly summarizes these phenomena:
"The existence of the United Nations . . . now provides a very clear,
75
very concentrated, focal point for state practice."'
Perhaps the most significant aspect of United Nations-era lawmaking is the role of the General Assembly and particularly the
resolutions adopted by that body. With practically all of the states
in the world represented there, the General Assembly can essentially
"supplement the treaty-making process by adopting declaratory resolutions which, if accepted by an overwhelming majority . . . can
76
also constitute 'generally accepted' principles of international law." 1
W.T. and S.V. Mallison describe the substantial impact of the United
Nations norm-creation processes as follows, by reference to the two
distinct functions of the General Assembly:
The first is as a major political organ of the United Nations with
a separate legal identity. The second is as a collective meeting of
the states of the world community which comprise its membership.
In this second function the legal authority of the Assembly is derived
directly from the member states who have the same legal authority
to develop and make international law in the General Assembly as
they do outside of it ....
The crucial point is that drawing on
both sources of authority, the great majority of the member states
have adopted the practice of expressing consensus on legal issues
177
through the General Assembly.

'T'
R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL
ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 2 (1963), quoted in MALLISON & MALLISON, THE
PALESTINE PROBLEM, supra note 54, at 146.

Id.
Sohn, "Generally Accepted" InternationalRules, supra note 33, at 1078.
17 MALLISON & MALLISON, THE PALESTINE PROBLEM, supra note 54, at 150-51
(footnotes omitted).
As stated by the Secretariat of the United Nations, a General Assembly pronouncement "may be considered to impart . . . a strong expectation that Members
of the international community will abide by it." Memorandum of the Office of
Legal Affairs of the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.610, para. 4, (quoted in 34
U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 8) at 15, U.N. Doc. E/3614/Rev. 1 (1962)). It should
also be noted that these changes in international lawmaking have not been externally
imposed:
[Tihey are the result of a voluntary acceptance by states of the need to
adapt the methods of law-creation to the needs of the rapidly growing and
changing world community. Any prior restrictions on the law-creating process were self-made, and they can be changed by the very method that
established them in the first place.
Sohn, "Generally Accepted" InternationalRules, supra note 33, at 1079.
175
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In no other realm of international law have the greatly changed
methods of developing new rules been felt more dramatically than
in the area of human rights. Through consensus or through nearunanimous vote, the General Assembly has adopted numerous instruments on human rights. With the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights of 1948 as the widely-recognized starting point of the postWar human rights movement, the United Nations has continued to
move stridently ahead in the definition and advancement of human
rights. The Universal Declaration has been implemented not only by
the two International Covenants, on Civil and Political Rights and
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, but also by "some fifty additional instruments on particular subjects, such as genocide, racial
discrimination, equality for women, treatment of prisoners and forced
78

labor."'1

Richard Bilder, a human rights scholar, may have slightly overstated
the case when he said, "In practice a claim is an international human
right if the United Nations General Assembly says it is. '

79

Never-

theless, there is at least an important core of truth in his words, for
the expression of views with near-unanimity in a body of universal
representation is indeed a powerful underpinning for an international
norm. 8 0 Significantly, a number of human rights tenets that have

Sohn, Fundamental Guarantees, supra note 30, at 1-2 & n.2 (citing Human
Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments, U.N. Sales No. E.83.XIV.1
(1983)). See also Sohn, "Generally Accepted" InternationalRules, supra note 33,
171

at 1078 & n.32.
179

Bilder, Rethinking InternationalHuman Rights: Some Basic Questions, 2 HUM.

RTS. J. 557, 559 (1969). A number of authorities endorse this reasoning and urge
states to hold one another to positions expressed in General Assembly actions. That
is, once a state has agreed to a position in a General Assembly declaration or
resolution, having certainly had the choice of objecting, other states are then fully
justified in expecting that state's actions to comport with the position. For further
explication of this logical approach that emphasizes the seriousness with which such
official state acts ought to be considered, see generally R. HIGGIns, supra note 174.
110In describing the crucial role of United Nations actions in the human rights
norm-creating process, Stephen P. Marks underscores the importance of community
values:
A constant feature of human existence is the existence of human needs.
To satisfy them, we generally use self-help. When there are social constraints
on the satisfaction of certain needs, they may become claims made by
individuals or groups seeking such satisfaction through the social process.
Other needs become recognized as requiring constant satisfaction and correspond to values in the society. One of the social institutions characterizing
societies, including international society, is legislation, by which certain
claims, values, or interests are formally recognized.
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gained strength in the post-War period bear on the laws governing
armed conflict. Some of these principles have reached nonderogable
status and are thus universally applicable in times of war as well as
peace. Moreover, human rights norms yield insight into world community values and expectations that are relevant to international
humanitarian legal analysis.
C. The Impact of Post-War Human Rights Advances on Civilian
Protections During Armed Conflict
In the above discussion of the development of humanitarian law
through the time of World War II, emphasis was placed on the
meaning and contours of "military necessity". Although the traditional humanitarian law placed a number of restrictions on permissible
actions through the "humanity" concept, these restrictions operated
essentially as limitations on the scope of the military necessity concept,
which concept remained the dominant of the two tenets.181 However,
the humanitarian legal order appears to have changed today, with
the humanity side of the dichotomy having gained remarkable independent strength through the post-War human rights movement.
Professor McDougal describes this modern concept of humanity as
follows:
It is said all over the world that the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, despite its origin in aspiration only, has become customary
international law. More precisely, it is not the Universal Declaration
alone, but the Universal Declaration in the whole global flow of
communication-the United Nations Charter, the two basic covenants, the ancillary covenants, the regional covenants, the national
constitutions, national legislation and decisions, writing of publicists
and so on-that have created a global bill of human rights. It is

International human rights are those human needs that have received formal
recognition as rights through the sources of international law ....

[T]he

availability of the General Assembly has made a new method of international
legislation possible, .

.

. "the emergence of a new customary rule of in-

ternational law relating to the establishment of a new law-creating process
in the field of human rights."
Marks, Emerging Human Rights: A New Generation for the 1980's?, in 2 SrUDIES
IN A JUST WORLD ORDER 501, 502 (R. Falk, F. Kratochwil & S. Mendlovitz eds.

1985) (quoting Sohn, Protection of Human Rights Through InternationalLegislation,
1 Rene Cassin Amicorum Discipulorumque Liber 330 (1969)).
I "The tension between military necessity and restraint on the conduct of belligerents is the hallmark of humanitarian law ....
was dominant." T. MERON, supra note 35, at 11.

Originally, military necessity
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this vast body of newly established law, not simply preference or
pious aspirations, that can now be drawn upon to fill in the outlines
81 2
of what is meant by humanity.
The present inquiry now turns to some specifics of this "vast body
of newly established law" that bear particularly on community values
respecting the problems of starvation and relief during armed conflict.
1. Overview of the Human Rights Movement and the
Establishment of Nonderogable Rights
The United Nations Charter includes numerous references to human
rights, and among them is the duty of all members to promote
"universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language
or religion.' ' 83 Although the Charter does not list specific human
rights, this provision was made concrete by the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly without dissent
in 1948.'4 The precise legal character of the Universal Declaration
has long been debated, but many persuasively contend that a member's
failure to respect the rights contained in the Declaration constitutes
a violation of the Charter.8 5 The rights recognized in the Universal
Declaration are many, including the right to life, liberty and security
of the person; freedom from slavery; and freedom from torture or
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Other
rights enunciated in the Declaration relate to criminal procedure,
privacy, domestic relations, freedom of expression, participation in
86
government, and economic and social freedom.
Even if one does not accept a close linkage between the Universal
Declaration and the Charter, an impressive number of resolutions,
declarations, and other indications of state practice have combined
to create a customary international law of human rights requiring

,82
McDougal, supra note 29, at 30; see also T. MERON, supra note 35, at 11.
"I U.N. Charter art. 55. For the text of the Charter, see 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993.
184 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 32. See L. HENKIN, Human
Rights, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 268, 269-70 (R. Bernhardt
ed. 1985).
181
E.g., A. ROBERTSON, HuMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 27 (1982) (quoting Professor
Sohn: "As the Declaration was adopted unanimously, without a dissenting vote, it
can be considered as an authoritative interpretation of the Charter of the highest
order.").
186 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 32. For a brief summary
of the rights, see L. HENKIN, supra note 184, at 270-71.
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every state to respect the rights set forth in the Declaration. General
Assembly resolutions have often been adopted (frequently without
objection) underscoring the requirement of all states to "observe
87
faithfully and strictly" the provisions of the Universal Declaration.1
Moreover, the international law of human rights includes a number
of formal human rights agreements, some of which have been acceded
to by many states. At the top of the list, on the global level, are
the United Nations Covenants. 8 8 On the regional level, parallel steps
have been taken through several comprehensive human rights agreements in Europe, 8 9 the Americas,'9 ° and, most recently, Africa.' 9 '
Finally, there are some fifty additional instruments dealing with particular subjects, a prime example of which is the Genocide Convention. 92
In the classical formulations, humanitarian law and human rights
law apply to different situations. Humanitarian law has historically
focused on protections for victims of armed conflicts between states.
On the other hand, the emphasis in human rights law has been on
the "intra-state tension between the government and the governed." 93
Nevertheless, as a number of commentators contend, 94 a growing
convergence of the two areas has evolved. This development is summarized by Professor Meron: "[Hiumanitarian law . . . has recently
become increasingly implicated in the regulation of intra-state behavior in situations of violence, [and] human rights law is also
concerned with protecting basic human rights in situations of inter-

A. ROBERTSON, supra note 185, at 28 (quoting the Declarations on Colonialism
of 1960 and 1962).
88 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
119See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, reprinted in 1950 Y.B. HUM. RTS. 418.
117

11oAmerican Convention on Human Rights, reprinted in
242 (I. Brownlie ed., 2d ed. 1981).

BASIC DOCUMENTS ON

HuMAN RIGHTS

,91
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).
192Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
1948, U.N.T.S. 277, reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 2, at 172 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. See Sohn, Fundamental Guarantees, supra note 30,
at 1-2.
'9 MERON, supra note 35, at 26.
" See, e.g., A. ROBERTSON, supra note 185, at 224-31; Dinstein, Human Rights
in Armed Conflict: International HumanitarianLaw, in 2 HuMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY IssuEs 345 (T. MERON ed. 1984); Schindler,
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 31 AM U. L. REv. 935 (1982).
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national and internal armed conflict and in other situations of violence."' 9 The two regimes, of course, share the important underpinning
96
of humanity, and there is a remarkable parallelism of norms as well. 1
For present purposes, however, one aspect of the post-War human
rights movement is of critical importance in understanding the contours of civilian protections during armed conflict today: the wide
acceptance of certain human rights as nonderogable or absolute.
In the international law of human rights it is acknowledged that
in periods of national emergency, such as war, a state sometimes
may take measures derogating from its obligations under the customary and conventional law of human rights. But permissible derogations are circumscribed; specifically, a state may derogate from
obligations only to the extent required by the emergency, and the
state must not act in violation of other international obligations, such
as the 1949 Geneva Conventions, in a case of international or internal
armed conflict. 19 Moreover, certain human rights may not be suspended under any circumstances. The most authoritative human rights
instruments are consistent in providing no allowance whatsoever for
derogation from four specific rights: the right to life; freedom from
torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; freedom
1 98
from slavery; and freedom from retroactive penal measures.
In the humanitarian law context, the nonderogable human rights
have special significance as evidence that the world community has
agreed that a certain small but significant subset of human rights
may not be suspended, no matter what the emergency. 199 The inquiry

supra note 35, 25-26.
idea of humanity has become the common denominator of human rights
law and of humanitarian law. The fact that these two systems of law have different
historical and doctrinal origins should not obscure the tremendous rapprochement
between them which has already taken place." Id. at 14.
'97 Sohn, Fundamental Guarantees, supra note 30, at 7.
191 See MERON, supra note 35, at 52 (citing the Political Covenant (Article 4), the
European Convention (Article 15), and the American Convention (Article 27)). See
also Sohn, Fundamental Guarantees, supra note 30, at 7-8 & n.1 1 (comparing lists
of nonderogable rights among the major United Nations and regional instruments).
On the nonderogable rights specified in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, see A. ROBERTSON, supra note 185, at 226 (listing seven "sacrosanct"
rights) and Buergenthal, To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible
191

T.

MERON,

196 "The

Derogations, in THE

INTERNATIONAL BIfL OF RIGHTS:
POLITICAL RIGHTS 72, 78-86 (L. Henkin ed. 1981).

THE

COVENANT ON CIvIL AND

199As a rebuttal to the view that the obligation to observe nonderogable rights
is binding only on state parties to one or more of the cited human rights instruments,
consider the reasoning of Nicole Questiaux, special rapporteur appointed by the
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now turns to the manner in which the nonderogable human rights
affirm and enhance civilian protections during armed conflict.
2. Impact of the Nonderogable Human Rights on Modern
Civilian Protections During Armed Conflict
The essence of the right to life in human rights law is the protection
against arbitrary deprivation of life. 200 Although the right to life is
nonderogable, the continued reality of armed conflict means deprivation of life within the context of "lawful acts of war" is not
violative of the right to life. 20 1 Thus, for example, although measures
against combatants in furtherance of lawful military objectives remain
accepted, the right to life underscores such humanitarian law norms
as that against killing prisoners.
Both the right to life and the freedom from torture or other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment converge with key norms of traditional humanitarian law. Each of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
prohibits murder and other acts of violence against protected persons.
Acts of "wilful killing, torture, or inhuman treatment" of protected

United Nations to study human rights during states of emergency. After acknowledging the principle that states normally are bound only by instruments they have
ratified, she stated:
But the idea of a basic minimum, from which no derogation is possible,
is present in a sufficient number of instruments to justify our approaching
the matter by reference to a general principle of law recognized in practice
by the international community, which could, moreover, regard it as a
peremptory norm of international law within the meaning of Article 53 of
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, whereby "a peremptory
norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by
the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which
no derogation is permitted . . . ." It therefore seems to us that the peremptory nature of the principle of non-derogation should be binding on
every State, whether or not it is a party and irrespective of the circumstances.
N. Questiaux, Study of the Implications for Human Rights of Recent Developments
Concerning Situations Known as States of Siege or Emergency, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1982/15, at 19 (1982) (footnote omitted). See also T. MERON, supra note 35,
at 59 (suggesting on the basis of the key instruments and the draft Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States that the common core of four nonderogable human rights "is binding on all States as customary law or even as jus
cogens").
200 See Ramcharan, supra note 46, at 3.
201 In a United Nations Report addressing the meaning of the right to life under
Article 6 of the Political Covenant, the Human Rights Committee stated: "[To the
extent that in present international law 'lawful acts of war' are recognized, such
lawful acts are deemed not to be prohibited by Article 6 . . .if they do not violate
internationally recognized laws and customs of war." Report of the Secretary-General
on Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, U.N. Doc. A/8052, at 104 (1970).
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persons are considered "grave breaches" under the Conventions and
as such are war crimes subject to universal jurisdiction. 20 2 Moreover,
common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions regarding internal
armed conflicts prohibits "at any time and in any place whatsoever
• . . violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture [of] [p]ersons taking no active
part in the hostilities.

' 20 3

Several practical results emerge from the interpenetration of humanitarian law and human rights norms. First, the human rights law
affords a new legal basis for protection of humanitarian legal rights.
Moreover, human rights instruments such as the Political Covenant
require parties to report measures in furtherance of the rights and
afford at least some degree of international supervision by the U.N.
Human Rights Committee. Finally, the increasing acceptance of the
Political Covenant implies that respect for its provisions is of such
concern to the international community that questions of compliance
with these rights are less susceptible to exclusion from international
scrutiny as matters within states' domestic jurisdiction. Thus, in
addition to enhancing crucial humanitarian rights, the modern law
of human rights makes possible a greater scrutiny of compliance with
24
these rights than did the humanitarian law conventions alone. 0
In addition to the foregoing nonderogable human rights, the international law regarding genocide is apposite to the problem of
starvation and relief during armed conflict. The prohibition against
genocide is widely accepted as jus cogens, and "the practice of
genocide is the clearest illustration of a violation of the right to
life." 20 5 The crime of genocide includes killing or causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members of a group and the deliberate
infliction of conditions of life calculated to physically destroy the
group, either wholly or in part, whether in time of peace or war. 2°6
The right to life is increasingly being linked to survival needs. Many
contend that the right includes not only protection from outright
murder (execution, disappearances, and torture), but also from dep-

202

See, e.g., Civilians Convention, supra note 2, art. 147.

203Id.

art. 3. The International Court of Justice recently stated that common

Article 3 is "a minimum yardstick" applicable to international armed conflict as
well. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
104

205

LIFE
20,

See A. ROBERTSON, supra note 185, at 230-31.
Gormley, Genocide and Mass Killings: Illusion and Reality, in
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 120, 129 (B. Ramcharan ed. 1985).
Genocide Convention, supra note 192.
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rivation of basic needs such as food and health care. 2 7 In short,
although the human rights instruments do not expressly deal with
denial of items of sustenance, "it is meaningless to differentiate killing
by an act of state and by starving a person to death, because both
forms of behavior constitute the worst forms of cruelty.

'20 8

With regard to the humanitarian law context of civilian protections,
it has been shown that the nonderogable human rights strengthen the
traditional humanitarian norms proscribing deliberate measures against
protected persons, including civilians. 209 Moreover, the link between
these rights and the protection of civilian sustenance during armed
conflict has been acknowledged. Noting the increasingly deep roots
of the Geneva Conventions and the post-War human rights advances,
one commentator stated: "All seem to agree that starvation of the
' 210
civilian population as an intentional strategy of war is prohibited.
Another writer directly referenced the Genocide Convention's proscription against "deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction", 2 1' contending

that this proscription was positive law and that "starvation [of civilians] would fall under this explicit prohibition.

' 21 2

Congruent with the post-War human rights advancements that bear
on humanitarian law, the main thrust of the 1977 Geneva Protocols
was to provide better protection for civilians against the effects of
armed hostilities. The following Protocol I language reflects this major
concern: "The civilian population as such, as well as individual
civilians shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence
the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian
population are prohibited.

' 213

Moreover, it is suggested that the

starvation and relief articles of Protocol I, addressed in depth in
Section IV below, are also consistent with and representative of the
crucial human rights advances noted above. Before turning to the
Protocols, however, some emerging human rights relative to sustenance and relief are examined.

2

See Menghistu, The Satisfaction of Survival Requirements, in THE RIGHT TO

LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 63 (B. Ramcharan ed. 1985). Accord P. MAcALISTER-

•SMrrH, supra note 153, at 64-65; Ramcharan, supra note 46, at 8-9.
208Menghistu, supra note 207, at 63.
20 See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text.
210 International Law and the Food Crisis, 1975 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 39,
50 (remarks of Jordan Paust).
211 Genocide Convention, supra note 192, art. 2(c).
112 R. MOFFIT, supra note 14, at 18.
213 Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 51(2).
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3. Emerging Human Rights: The Right to Food and the Right
to HumanitarianAssistance
The inquiry so far has focused on perhaps the most urgent human
rights, those that have such unequivocal support in international
instruments as to be widely considered nonderogable, and even to
have risen to the level of jus cogens. Indeed, the right to life and
the freedom from torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment have been frequently reaffirmed and strengthened since
their enunciation in 1948 in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the Genocide Convention. It has been suggested that these
paramount civil and political rights have particular significance in
the humanitarian law of armed conflict. Also important, however,
are human rights in the realm of economic and social values that
have underpinnings in the Universal Declaration as well.
By reference to the motto of the French revolution-libert,
galit,
fraternit-KarelVasak has identified a third generation of human
rights predicated on brotherhood (fraternit), in the sense of solidarity. 214 These rights are characterized by the relatively new aspirations they express, and by the fact that "they seek to infuse the
human dimension into areas where it has all too often been missing"
and that "they can be realized only through the concerted efforts of
all the actors on the social scene: the individual, the State, public
and private bodies and the international community.' '215 In a persuasive endorsement of Vasak's notion, Stephen Marks calls this body
of rights a "new generation" of human rights corresponding to
"certain major planetary concerns, which, although they were always
present and sometimes acutely felt in the past, have taken on a
renewed urgency at a time when the legislative process in the field
'21 6
of human rights is particularly receptive.
Although some authorities challenge the strength and even the very
bases of economic and social human rights, 217 the "new generation"
right that finds perhaps the most support is the right to food. In-

24 On the work of Karel Vasak in this area, see generally Marks, supra note 180,
at 506.
25 Lecture of Karel Vasak, Tenth Study Session of the International Institute of
Human Rights (July, 1979), quoted in Marks, supra note 180, at 506.
216 Marks, supra note 180, at 505-06.
237 For analysis of a variety of economic human rights issues, see the following
Symposium Proceedings: Development as an Emerging Economic Right, 15 CAt.
W. INT'L. L.J. 429 (1985); InternationalLaw and World Hunger, 70 Iowa L. Rev.
1279 (1985).
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disputably, global concern about world sustenance has advanced dramatically in the post-War years, having been the "subject of genuinely
interdisciplinary investigation and enlightened debate ... in a way
that has not occurred previously.

' 21 8

Particularly in view of the

unprecedented response to the African drought of the early 1980s,
it may fairly be stated that eradication of such tragedies has become
a prominent interest of the world community.
The emerging right to food stands firmly on a number of bases,
as "[flormal international law is replete with declarations of a right
to food. ' 219 The Universal Declaration specifies the right to food as
part of the right to an adequate standard of living. 220 The 1966
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights expands the notion
by obligating states to act individually and through international
cooperation to effectuate "the fundamental right of everyone to be
free from hunger." ' 22' Additionally, a basic right to food is acknowl-

edged in numerous declarations of the General Assembly, including
the 1974 Resolution 3348 (XXIX) endorsing the Declaration on the
222
Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition.

The right to humanitarian assistance is also cited as an emerging
or "new generation" human right. Indeed, the concept that people
in dire need have a right to assistance from the international community is a natural manifestation of the solidarity principle. 22a Although the term "humanitarian assistance" is not prevalent in human
rights- instruments, the concept follows directly from provisions dealing with the rights to life, health, food and shelter, and to special
care for children and the sick. Moreover, the Universal Declaration
provides support for important principles relevant to humanitarian
assistance, including the obligation to cooperate with and assist others
218 Marks, supra note 180, at 506. Evidence of such profound interest and multifaceted inquiry into the matter of a global right to food is seen in the collection
of essays, THE RIGHT TO FOOD (P. Alston & K. Tomasevski eds. 1984).
219 InternationalLaw and the Food Crisis, supra note 210, at 45-46 (remarks of
Jordan Paust). See also Alston, International Law and the Human Right to Food,
in THE RIGHT TO FOOD 9, 21 (P. Alston & K. Tomasevski eds. 1984).
220 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 32, art. 25.
221 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note
188, art. 11.
222 The first article of the Universal Declaration on the Eradication of
Hunger
and Malnutrition provides: "Every man, woman and child has the inalienable right
to be free from hunger and malnutrition in order to develop fully and maintain
their physical and mental faculties." Report of the World Food Conference, Nov.
5-16, 1974, U.N. Doc. No. E/CONF.65/20, at 2 (1975).
223 Marks, supra note 180, at 510-11.
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in times of emergency and to accept relief following a disaster if
domestic resources are inadequate. Finally, the human rights tenets
focusing on the minimum necessities of life, such as Article 25 of
the Universal Declaration, lead naturally to a right to humanitarian
assistance as a crucial means of ensuring that populations are supplied
with the minimum necessities to sustain life. 224 As one commentator
summarized: "Humanitarian assistance deserves the particular attention of the international community because of the concrete appli'225
cation of fundamental human rights involved.
Despite the obvious links between these "new generation" human
rights and such sacrosanct principles as the right to life, it is not
suggested that the rights to food and humanitarian assistance apply
a priori to armed conflict as do the nonderogable rights. However,
the phenomenon of concerted efforts to further these rights reveals
much about contemporary community values. Moreover, although
viewed as "emerging", these rights draw weighty support from prominent human rights instruments, which constitute a significant benchmark of international consensus. In sum, the human rights to food
and humanitarian assistance shed additional light on the modern
principle of humanity in the calculus of international humanitarian
law norms.
4.

Reaffirmation of the Distinction Principle

The foregoing analysis reveals that the law of human rights has
been prominent in expressions of individual and collective state prerogatives in the post-War, United Nations era of international norm
creation. The principle of distinction enjoys a similar emphasis in
the international law of armed conflict, especially in the direct reaffirmation of this essential underpinning of civilian protection.
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC), with widespread representation from the states
of the world, worked to keep key principles of civilian protection at
the forefront of international concern. 226 The General Assembly of

224 See P. MAcALISTER-SMITH, supra note 153, at 64-65 (citing international human
rights instruments).
"IsId. at 65-66.
226

The activities of the ICRC during this period are detailed in F.

KALSHOVEN,

supra note 75, at 42-44. The climactic event in this process was passage of Resolution
XXVIII at the 20th International Conference of the Red Cross in Vienna in 1965,
which resolution stated in part that "all Governments and other authorities responsible for action in armed conflict" should conform as a minimum to a set of
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the United Nations then took up the matter, resulting in the unanimous adoption in 1968 of Resolution 2444 (XXII) concerning "Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts" .227 Significantly, the
Resolution included the precise statement of the distinction principle
that had been refined by the ICRC. In 1970, the crucial tenets of
civilian protection were reaffirmed by the General Assembly in Resolution 2675 (XXV). 22s Besides containing a statement of humanitarian

law principles such as the distinction principle, Resolution 2675 linked
these protections with the human rights movement: "Fundamental
human rights, as accepted in international law and laid down in
international instruments, continue to apply fully in situations of
armed conflict.' '229
In summary, further development through the United Nations of
the cornerstone distinction principle and other humanitarian concepts
of civilian protection bespeaks a strengthening of these principles.
According to Professor Kalshoven, the "reaffirmation of the principles in question as valid norms of international law can certainly
be regarded as an authoritative statement of the law."

23 0

Now, having

examined the contextual foundation of post-War international consensus regarding matters of humanitarian and human rights law, the
inquiry turns to consideration of the provisions on starvation and
relief which were drafted by the 1974-77 Geneva Diplomatic Conference.
IV.

PROTOCOL I PROVISIONS ON THE PROBLEMS OF STARVATION
AND

RELIEF

The post-War activity of the international community detailed above
demonstrates a heightened concern for the rights and protection of
victims of armed conflict. Underlying the human rights instruments
and General Assembly resolutions are the unmistakable principles and

four principles, including "that distinction must be made at all times between persons
taking part in the hostilities and members of the civilian population, to the effect
that the latter be spared as much as possible." 20th International Conference of
the Red Cross, Resolution XXVIII, Protection of Civilian Populations Against the
Dangers of Indiscriminate Warfare, Vienna, Austria, 1965, reprinted in Schindler &
Toman, supra note 2, at 195.
227 G.A. Res. 2444, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 50-51, U.N. Doc. A/7218
(1968). See supra note 157.
228 G.A. Res. 2675, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 76, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970).
229

Id.

230 F. KALSHOVEN,

supra note 75, at 44.
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aspirations of humanity, quickened by "the sad experiences" of armed
conflicts of the previous decades. 23' Thus, besides the articulated need

to fill gaps in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and to address limits
on methods of warfare, 23 2 the changing concept of humanity, also,
served as a catalyst for the unprecedented level of participation by
members of the international community in the effort to supplement
the 1949 Conventions. 23 3 Based on the tenor of international expressions in the years preceding the Conference, and in the light of such
tragedies as the devastation in Viet Nam and the starvation in Biafra,
the Protocol I emphasis on issues of civilian starvation and relief is
not surprising.
Starvation of Civilians as a Method of Warfare

A.

Reflective of Protocol I's acute emphasis on civilian protections is
that instrument's Article 54 on starvation, 23 4 which provides:
Article 54-Protection of Objects Indispensable to the Survival of
the Civilian Population
1. Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.
2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as
foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops,
livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation
works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance
value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever
the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them
to move away, or for any other motive.
3. The prohibitions in para. 2 shall not apply to such of the objects
covered by it as are used by an adverse Party:
(a) as sustenance solely for the members of its armed forces; or
(b) if not as sustenance, then in direct support of military action,
provided, however, that in no event shall actions against these
objects be taken which may be expected to leave the civilian
population with such inadequate food or water as to cause its
starvation or force its movement.
4. The objects shall not be made the object of reprisals.

231

See supra text accompanying note 158.

232See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
233See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
234Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 54.
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5. In recognition of the vital requirements of any Party to the
conflict in the defense of its national territory against invasion,
derogation from the prohibitions contained in para. 2 may be made
by a Party to the conflict within such territory under its own control
where required by imperative military necessity.
Article 54 is contained in the section of the Protocol that is generally
aimed at advancing the law regarding conduct of hostilities. 235 Rather
than leave the issue of civilian sustenance in the fog of the "military
necessity" concept, Article 54 begins boldly in paragraph 1: "Starvation as a method of warfare is prohibited." The four remaining
paragraphs not only shape the contours of the general prohibition,
but also address the realities of military considerations.
Paragraph 2 brings specificity into the article in a number of
important ways. The provision addresses the range of acts (attacking,
destroying, removing or rendering useless) that are prohibited against
objects indispensable to civilian survival. Paragraph 2 also provides
criteria for determining which objects are covered by the prohibition
and addresses the problematical issues regarding purpose and motive.
The "military objects" issue is addressed in paragraph 3, which
provides that objects are not immune from attack if used "as sustenance solely for the

. . .

armed forces" or if used "in direct support

of military action." Paragraph 4 applies the overall Protocol I prohibition against civilian reprisals (Article 51) to the specific case of
objects of sustenance. Finally, paragraph 5 provides a military necessity derogation from the prohibition when such action is vital to
236
the defense of a party's own national territory.
Paragraph I's simply-stated, yet potentially far-reaching prohibition
against starvation of civilians did not appear in the ICRC working
draft used at the outset of the negotiations in 1974.237 The original
provision dealt with indispensable objects in a fashion similar to
233 Among other matters included in the section (articles 48-60) are the following:
codification of the customary rule of proportionality (Articles 51 and 57); special
protection of dams, dikes, and nuclear power stations (Article 51); and protection
of the natural environment (Article 55). See ALDRICH, New Life, supra note 1, at
778.
236 For the text of paragraphs 2-5 of Article 54, see supra text accompanying note
234.
237 For the text of the Draft Additional Protocol, see 1 United Nations, Official
Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of
InternationalHumanitarianLaw Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva 1974-1977,
pt. 3, at 16 (1978) [hereinafter Official Records]. Article 48 of the draft contained
the provision on objects indispensable to civilian survival and is reprinted in 3 H.
LEVIE, PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS: PROTOCOL I TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS
227 (1980).
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paragraph 2 of the Article that was eventually adopted. Among several
proposed amendments to the draft in the 1974 meetings of Committee
III was the first direct reference to starvation. Although the matter
drew little attention in the early going, the amendment proposed by
Belgium and Great Britain in March of 1974 was included verbatim
in the final document as paragraph 1 of Article 54.238
Despite the seeming lack of interest in the bold starvation prohibition in Committee III plenary meetings, the amendment was discussed in depth and approved by the Working Group. The Group's
concern about the expansive scope of the provision influenced the
contours of the prohibition formed by the paragraphs that follow it.
According to the Rapporteur, the Working Group deemed paragraph
1 "a useful statement of the basic principle from which the rest of
the article flows."' 23 9 Not only did Committee III adopt paragraph 1
by consensus on March 14, 1975, but the provision remained intact
until adopted by the entire Conference by consensus on May 27,
1977.4
Perhaps the heart of Article 54 is paragraph 2, which in large
measure provides the guidelines by which a plan to attack items of
sustenance must be evaluated. Several important issues are addressed,
including the confusing interplay between "purpose" and "motive,"
the scope of persons protected, and the range of items that are immune
from attack.
The foundation for paragraph 2 was the ICRC draft, which provided a list of sustenance items that a belligerent would be forbidden
to destroy "to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away or
for any other reason." ' 24' But the provision underwent considerable
refinement in the Working Group. Among the difficulties were two
issues relating to the purpose of such attacks. First, to be workable
the provision had to allow destruction of sustenance items such as
irrigation works when necessary, for example, to keep the enemy

23

U.N. Doc. CDDH/III/67, 3 Official Records, supra note 237, at 218. To trace

the proposed amendment through the negotiations, see 3 H. LEVlE, supra note 237,
at 229, 241, & 243-44.
239 U.N. Doc. CDDH/III/264/Rev. 1, 15 Official Records, supra note 237, at 348
(Report to Committee III on the Work of the Working Group).

240 See 3 H. LEVEE,
supra note 237, at 244, 256 (with citations to negotiating
documents approved by Committee III and the Conference as a whole in 1975 and

1977, respectively).

241The text of the relevant ICRC draft article is provided in 3 H. LEvrE, supra
note 237, at 227.
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from advancing. Accordingly, the Working Group (with finishing
touches applied by the Drafting Committee) came up with the prohibition against attacks "for the specific purpose of denying [the
items] for their sustenance value.

'242

Another concern was the need to ensure that the provision covered
specious excuses a party might use to justify destruction of sustenance
items. For example, if not carefully drawn, the provision might give
a belligerent leeway to say, "We didn't destroy the crops to starve
the civilians, just to force them to evacuate for lack of food." As
a result, the drafters focused on the proscribed purpose of denying
the objects for their sustenance value, no matter what the underlying
243
motive (starvation, evacuation, etc.) may be.

Of potentially far-reaching consequence is paragraph 2's language
regarding the scope of persons protected. Although the overall thrust
of the article is civilian protection, paragraph 2 proscribes denial of
24
sustenance items "to the civilian population or to the adverse Party. "
Although paragraph 3 states unambiguously that a belligerent may
derogate from the rule if the items are used solely by the adverse
Party, the paragraph 2 wording ostensibly removes the option of
destroying sustenance items used by both civilians and military personnel. Accordingly, the article advances humanitarianism by disallowing indiscriminate starvation measures under some notion of
''military necessity" in scenarios where both military forces and
civilians might consequently suffer. By way of recent example, the
Beirut sieges aimed at starving Palestinian forces-which also severely
harmed civilians in besieged refugee camps-would appear to be
245
violations of this rule.

2

U.N. Doc. CDDH/215/Rev. 1, 15 Official Records, supra note 237, at 279

(Report of Committee III, Second Session). See generally M. BOTHE, K. PARTSCH
& W. SOLF, supra note 127, at 338-39 (example of a railroad line used to transport
food being a lawful target if otherwise a military objective under Article 52).
243 The

Working Group proposal that was adopted by Committee III included the

prohibition against attacks on objects indispensable to civilian survival "for the
specific purpose of denying them as such." U.N. Doc. CDDH/III/266, 15 Official

Records, supra note 237, at 308. The Rapporteur acknowledged drafting problems
and noted particularly that the intended prohibition against any destruction of items
to keep people from consuming them was "a heavy burden of meaning to be carried
by the two words 'as such."' U.N. Doc. CDDH/215/Rev. 1, 15 Official Records,

supra note 237, at 279. Before adoption by the Conference, the Drafting Committee
strengthened the wording by replacing "as such" with "for their sustenance value."
U.N. Doc. CDDH/401, reprinted in 3 H. LEVIE, supra note 237, at 256.
2-

24

Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 54, para. 2 (emphasis added).
See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text. Applicability of Protocol I
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The ICRC draft referred only to civilians, but two early amendments proposed by the United States and by Belgium and the United
Kingdom used the wording "for the purpose of denying them to the
enemy or the civilian population. ' 246 The negotiating papers show
little attention focused on the matter, with not even an explanatory
comment by the Rapporteur when the Working Group proposal with
the words "or to the adverse party" was forwarded. 247 This language
passed every subsequent scrutiny-(Committee III approval, Drafting
248
Committee action, and Conference approval)-without controversy.

Accordingly, although seen by some as reflecting a divergence from
customary humanitarian law, 249 this language did not occasion the
flurry of contention that one would expect from such a change.
Committee III addressed the list of protected sustenance objects
in depth in paragraph 2. The ICRC draft's list was similar to the
provision later adopted, but would have made the list exhaustive by
preceding it with "namely". To make the list illustrative instead,
Finland and Sweden suggested in an early proposal that "namely"
be replaced with "such as". 2 10 Although the delegation from the

provisions to the Beirut conflict is by no means clear (because of the international
and noninternational aspects of the conflict). However, it has been suggested that
the war in Lebanon is an "internationalized civil war" and thus must be evaluated
in bifurcated fashion according to its international and noninternational components.
Gasser, supra note 34, at 912, 921-23.
246 U.N. Doc. CDDH/III/50, 3 Official Records, supra note 237, at 217 (U.S.
amendment proposal of Mar. 18, 1974); U.N. Doc. CDDH/III/67, 3 Official Records,
supra note 237, at 218 (Belgium/U.K. amendment proposal of Mar. 19, 1974).
241 According to the Rapporteur, the Working Group Report to Committee III
(U.N. Doc. CDDH/111/264, 15 Official Records, supra note 237, at 348-50) was
not a complete account of the deliberations. It dealt "with the articles which had
proved to be the most difficult." U.N. Doc. CDDH/III/SR.31, 14 Official Records,
supra note 237, at 299-300. Because of its omission from the report and debates
on the Working Group proposal, it can be presumed that the language "or to the
adverse Party" posed no significant difficulty.
248 See supra note 240 for citation to documents
outlining the adoption of the
article as the Conference progressed. Regarding comments on the proposals (and
the lack of contention concerning the instant language), see 3 H. LEVIE, supra note
237, at 230-46, 255-58.
249 E.g., Solf, supra note 3, at 133 (stating that the Lieber Code remains reflective
of customary international law and that Article 54 "establishes a substantially new
principle which is not yet customary international law"); Telephone interview with
Waldemar A. Solf, supra note 152 (specifically citing "or adverse party" language
as contrary to customary international law). See also supra note 127 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 296-314 and accompanying text.
250 U.N. .Doc. CDDH/III/13, 3 Official Records, supra note 237, at 216 (amendment proposed by Finland and Sweden on Mar. 12, 1974). The text of the relevant
ICRC draft article is provided in 3 H. LEvrE, supra note 237, at 227.
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United Kingdom preferred keeping the list exhaustive to provide
clearer guidance to the field commander, 25 ' the illustrative language
was adopted in deference to the view that other life-sustaining objects
such as clothing and shelter in certain climatic conditions should be
covered. The Working Group rejected proposals to add items such
as fuel reservoirs and communications systems used for food distribution. 2 2 Consequently, despite the abstraction of an illustrative list,
the reluctance to include items other than those related to food and
drink may make it "difficult to establish that objects other than the
latter category are intended to be protected by the Article. ' 253 The
Committee III Rapporteur, Ambassador Aldrich, later explained the
balancing of interests that led to the adoption of the final list. First,
the illustrative approach was a matter of caution since every contingency could not be foreseen. Fuel reservoirs and similar items were
rejected as invariably important military objectives. Alternatively, the
few food and water-related items included in the list were those "that
'254
could be identified as always indispensable.
The ICRC draft contained no provisions allowing derogation from
the general requirements of paragraph 2, but such provisions were
the subject of several amendments proposed early in the deliberations. 55 Rather than attaching the derogation provision to an already
complex paragraph 2, the Working Group formed a two-part paragraph 3 to cover situations in which the paragraph 2 prohibitions
would not apply. First, paragraph 3(a) recognizes the "military necessity" of actions against an enemy's objects of sustenance used
"solely for the members of its armed forces." Although the provision
preserves starvation of armed forces as a method of warfare, it also
underscores, by use of the qualifier "solely", the implication in
25 U.N. Doc. CDDH/III/SR.17, 14 Official Records, supra note 237, at 148
(statement of Sir David Hughes-Morgan, United Kingdom, on Feb. 11, 1975).
252 Ghana proposed the addition of "means of communications, such as arterial
roads essential to the supply of such indispensable objects." U.N. Doc. CDDH/
111/28, 3 Official Records, supra note 237, at 216. A proposal by thirteen Middle
Eastern countries urged adding "fuel reservoirs and refineries" because "fuel concerned the whole international community, which depended on oil in all spheres."
U.N. Doc. CDDH/III/Sr.16, 14 Official Records, supra note 237, at 127 (statement
of Mr. El Ghonemy, Egypt, on Feb. 10, 1975, introducing proposed amendment,
U.N. Doc. CDDH/III/63, 3 Official Records, supra note 237, at 217).
253 M. BOTHE, K. PARTSCH & W. SOLF, supra note 127, at 340 & n.17.
214Aldrich, New Life, supra note 1, at 779 (emphasis in original).
255 E.g., U.N. Docs. CDDH/III/10 and CDDH/III/74, 3 Official Records, supra
note 237, at 207, 219 (proposed amendments of Romania of Mar. 12, 1974 and
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic of Mar. 21, 1974, respectively).

1989]

CIVILIAN STARVATION

paragraph 2 that destruction of items used by both civilians and
military personnel is prohibited. 26 This may prove difficult to apply
since it might well afford protection even to objects in military supply
channels if those objects are intended for protected persons such as
25 7
prisoners of war or civilians in occupied territory.
While paragraph 3(a) excludes from paragraph 2's protection objects used for military sustenance, the first clause of paragraph 3(b)
excludes items used "in direct support of military action" in ways
unrelated to their sustenance value. 258 Although the latter provision
is supported by the military necessity notion, it arguably adds nothing
to Article 54. That is, there appears to be no need for a "direct
military support" exception because the prohibition in paragraph 2
apples only if the object is being attacked to deny its sustenance
value. This matter did not present a major difficulty in the Working
Group, but the dynamics of the consensus-building process within
the Group may have given rise to the language of paragraph 3(b).
For example, the "direct military support" idea appeared in proposals
by socialist delegations, who may have insisted on such a provision. 25 9
The Rapporteur's frustration with the drafting process is reflected in
his comment regarding paragraph 3 in the Working Group Report:
"Here the drafter continues to be plagued by the necessity of distinguishing between uses of the objects as sustenance and other uses.'260
Perhaps a better explanation for the phrase "direct military support" is that it was intended not as a restatement of the exception
already contained implicitly in paragraph 2, but rather, as introductory
language to the proviso that follows the phrase in paragraph 3(b).
Specifically, paragraph 3(b) states that not even the "direct military
support" justification warrants destruction of an item if such destruction is "expected to leave the civilian population with such
inadequate food or water as to cause its starvation or force its
movement." In other words, although couched in language suggesting
256 See

supra notes 244-49 and accompanying text.
See generally M. BOTHE, K. PARTSCH & W. SOLF, supra note 127, at 340-41
& n.18 (with citations to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Protocol I articles that
protect POWs and civilians in occupied territory).
257

258For

the text of Article 54, paragraph 3(b), see supra text accompanying note

234.

239See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
260U.N. Doc. CDDH/III/264, 14 Official Records, supra note 237, at 349. Am-

bassador Aldrich's transmittal of the Working Group proposal was apologetic for
the shortcomings of the final language: "The Rapporteur hopes the Drafting Com-

mittee will have better luck." Id.
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an exception to the paragraph 2 prohibition, paragraph 3(b) arguably
has much more impact as a limit on the "military necessity" grounds
a belligerent may use to try to avoid the prohibition.
By way of example, a belligerent might reasonably attack an irrigation canal used as a defensive position, a water tower used as
26
an observation post, or an orchard used as cover for the enemy. 1
Such attacks would not run afoul of paragraph 2 because they would
not be directed at denying sustenance value. Likewise, the attacks
would be justified under the first clause of paragraph 3(b) because
of the objects' direct military uses. However, the second clause of
paragraph 3(b) would require the potential attacker to inject into the
decision the additional consideration of whether the destruction might
cause civilian starvation or force movement of the civilian population.
Accordingly, the second clause of paragraph 3(b) both strengthens
the starvation prohibition and weakens the military necessity exception, but only in the limited factual scenario in which an object is
both being used for direct military support and is desperately needed
by civilians in the area. Moreover, Ambassador Aldrich has suggested
that the object might still be attacked as long as the belligerent
thereafter acts "to ensure relief . . . in the extreme case where such
destruction would cause starvation or force movement of the civilian
population. "262
The general prohibition against civilian reprisals is applied specifically to sustenance objects in paragraph 4. The reference to reprisals
in Article 54, however, appears only to underscore for these objects
the overall ban on reprisals. 263 No unique contentions regarding sus-

tenance reprisals surfaced in the negotiations. In fact, even those
delegations that disagreed with wholesale prohibition of civilian reprisals "approved of the prohibition in regard to Art. 54, which was
adopted by consensus. ' ' 2 64 Accordingly, the vigorous debate about

civilian reprisals in general need not be addressed in the present
inquiry.

265

261 See generally M. BOTHE,
K. PARTSCH & W. SOLF, supra note 127, at 341
(providing hypothetical situations).
262 Aldrich, New Life, supra note 1, at 779.
263 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
264 M. BOTRE, K. PARTSCH & W. SOLF, supra note 127, at 342 & n.20.
263 For a persuasive defense of the prohibition against civilian reprisals, see Kalshoven, ProtocolsAdditional to the Geneva Conventions on the Law of War, 1980
AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 191, 204-07 (citing several Protocol I articles intended
to protect civilians and stating: "If one attacks the civilian population [by way of
reprisal], it escapes me how the attacker can at the same time protect it."). Id. at

205.
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Paragraph 5 addresses actions by a party in its own territory.
Paragraph 5 permits a party defending its national territory to pursue
a "scorched earth" course if such a course is made "imperative by
military necessity. ' ' 266 Although some conferees disagreed with this
apparent sanction of civilian starvation measures, the Working Group
concluded that a blanket prohibition in a party's own territory would
be unrealistic. Because of the preeminent right to defend one's territory, the view was that it would be impossible to prohibit a completely "scorched earth" policy where the armed forces were being
267
forced to retreat within their own country.

Until the last session of the Conference in 1977, the matter of
actions within a party's own territory was considered along with
issues relating to occupying powers. 268 Accordingly, the Working
Group's proposal approved in 1975 contained only paragraphs 1
through 4 and did not deal with the issue. The Working Group's
position that the "national territory" concern would require a stated
exception was expressed by adding the paragraph 5 language to the
article dealing with occupation. 269 However, in the final refinements
by the Drafting Committee, the "occupation" article analogous to
Article 54 was deleted as surplusage. Not only did the Civilians
Convention already contain expansive protections against such actions
by an occupying power, but Article 49 of Protocol I made Article
54 universally applicable by stating that the articles in the section
applied "to all attacks in whatever territory conducted," and (by
explicit reference to the Civilians Convention) "to the whole of the
populations of the countries in conflict.

' 27 0

However, because of the

consensus in favor of an exception for a party's action in its own

26

For the full text of paragraph 5 of Article 54, see supra text at note 234.

U.N. Doc. CDDH/III/369, 15 Official Records, supra note 237, at 509
(Report to Committee III on the Work of the Working Group, Apr. 28, 1977).
268 Early in the 1975 session, the ICRC Representative, Mrs. Bindschedler-Robert,
explained to Committee III that Article 48 of the ICRC Draft (corresponding to
the eventual Article 54) did not apply to objects under a party's own power. Rather,
267See

she said, the cases of control of objects by virtue of either occupation or by presence

of the objects in a party's own national territory were covered by Article 66 of the
ICRC Draft. U.N. Doc. CDDH/III/SR.17, 14 Official Records, supra note 237, at

141.

269 U.N.

Doc. CDDH/III/373, 14 Official Records, supra note 237, at 492 (Com-

mittee III adoption of draft Article 66). See 3 H. LEvIE, supra note 237, at 25455.
270 Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 49. For an overview of the ways in which the
Civilians Convention addressed civilian sustenance in occupied territory, see supra
note 37 and accompanying text.

GA. J. INT'L & ComiP. L.

[Vol. 19:1

territory, the language was inserted into Article 54 as paragraph 5
before final adoption by the Conference in plenary session on May

27, 1977.271
Because of the universal applicability of Article 54 and the lack
of any further stated exceptions, it follows that any "scorched earth"
measure that does not fall under the narrow exception in paragraph
5 of that article would be impermissible. Accordingly, even if part
of its territory is under occupation by another, the party would be
prohibited from attacking objects within the occupation area for
purposes of denial of sustenance. Moreover, the "scorched earth"
practices of the Nazi German Army to protect forces retreating from
Norway, arguably permissible under Hague law, 272 would be prohibited under Article 54.273
The Protocol I treatment of starvation in warfare reflects the
complexities of the issues and the deference that must be accorded
to the harsh realities of warfare. Although the prohibitions are not
absolute, Article 54 contains both general humanitarian principles
and criteria to guide decision-making during conflict. These provisions
is an overdue development of combat rules, and the degree of consensus reached on Article 54 portends its validity as an affirmation
of the expectations of the world community.
B.

Relief in Favor of Civilians During Warfare

The prohibitions against starvation measures address just one dimension of the problem of civilian sustenance during warfare. Generally speaking, Article 54 defines in part what belligerents cannot
do in waging war. Nevertheless, some objects may legitimately be
destroyed based on exceptions to the prohibitions. Moreover, civilian
sustenance problems are also frequently exacerbated during conflict
by a weakening of the economy and a general deterioration of living
conditions. That is, considerable suffering may result even if the
Article 54 prohibitions are observed. Therefore, the matter of what
271 U.N. Doc. CDDH/401, reprinted in 3 H. LEVIE, supra note 237, at 255-56
(article reviewed by the Drafting Committee and transmitted to the Conference for
adoption, 1977); U.N. Doc. CDDH/SR.42, 6 Official Records, supra note 237, at
205 (Plenary Meeting of May 27, 1977, at which the starvation article was adopted
by consensus).
272 See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
273 M. BOTrE, K. PARTSCH & W. SOLF, supra note 127, at 342 (concurring in the
view that the only "scorched earth" practice permissible under Protocol I is the
narrow situation addressed in paragraph 5, Article 54).
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the parties should or must do to remedy such suffering is crucial.
This other affirmative dimension is addressed in the articles on relief.
Although the Civilians Convention dealt comprehensively and satisfactorily with relief in occupied territory, gaping holes remained in
27 4
the provisions pertaining to areas not under enemy occupation.
Moreover, the 1949 Geneva Conventions did not appreciably advance
protections for personnel participating in relief operations. It follows,
then, that Protocol I's codification of rules on relief actions in nonoccupied territories and of substantive protections for relief personnel
are indeed "important achievements."

1.

275

Relief Actions

The difficulty of refining a regime governing relief operations is
apparent in the sheer length of Article 70 of the Protocol, 276 which
follows:
Article 70 - Relief Actions

1. If the civilian population of any territory under the control of
a Party to the conflict, other than occupied territory, is not adequately provided with the supplies mentioned in Article 69, relief
actions which are humanitarian and impartial in character and conduced without any adverse distinction shall be undertaken, subject
to the agreement of the Parties concerned in such relief actions.
Offers of such relief shall not be regarded as interference in the
armed conflict or as unfriendly acts. In the distribution of relief
consignments, priority shall be given to those persons, such as
children, expectant mothers, maternity cases and nursing mothers,
who, under the Fourth Convention or under this Protocol, are to
be accorded privileged treatment or special protection.
2. The Parties to the conflict and each High Contracting Party shall
allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equipment and personnel provided in accordance with
this Section, even if such assistance is destined for the civilian
population of the adverse Party.

274

275

See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.

M.

BOTE,

K.

PARTSCH

& W.

SOLF,

supra note

127, at 426-27. It should be

noted that two of the authors (Professor Bothe of the Federal Republic of Germany
and Professor Solf) of this highly-regarded, comprehensive commentary on Protocol
I were intimately involved with the refinement of the relief articles as members of
Committee II. See generally 4 H. LEvrE, PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS: PROTOCOL
I TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS 9-25 (1981) (discussing the negotiating history
of Articles 70 and 71).
276 Protocol
I, supra note 1, art. 70.
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3. The Parties to the conflict and each High Contracting Party
which allows the passage of relief consignments, equipment and
personnel in accordance with paragraph 2:
(a) shall have the right to prescribe the technical arrangements,
including search, under which such passage is permitted;
(b) may make such permission conditional on the distribution of
this assistance being made under the local supervision of a Protecting Power;
(c) shall in no way whatsoever divert relief consignments from
the purpose for which they are intended nor delay their forwarding, except in cases of urgent necessity in the interest of the
civilian population.
4. The Parties to the conflict shall protect relief consignments and
facilitate their rapid distribution.

5. The Parties to the conflict and each High Contracting Party
concerned shall encourage and facilitate effective international coordination of the relief actions referred to in paragraph 1.
Among the primary issues addressed by the conferees considering
this article were the contours of the relief obligation attaching to the
various parties, the conditions placed on the duty to allow relief,
and the nature of procedural agreements necessary to carry out relief
operations. Additional, practical matters such as priority among relief
recipients and the role of humanitarian agencies and protecting powers
had to be considered. Finally, myriad philosophical issues muddied
the waters as well, including the traditional balancing of military
necessity and humanity, and the receiving country's sensitivities, due
to security concerns and national pride, about relief efforts undertaken
within its boundaries.
Regarding the nature of the relief obligation, the ICRC draft stated
that the parties "shall agree to and facilitate" relief to civilian populations if inadequately supplied.2 71 However, consensus developed
in the Working Group to place parties under a more clearly defined
The ICRC draft provision is set forth in 4 H. LEvE, supra note 275, at 9.
As to the designation of items which must be in inadequate supply to trigger the
article, the ICRC draft specified "foodstuffs, clothing, medical and hospital stores
and means of shelter." Id. As adopted, Article 70 covers an expanded list (by
reference to Article 69 on duties of an occupying power): "food and medical supplies,
277

• . . clothing, bedding, means of shelter, other supplies essential to the survival of

the civilian population ...
I, supra note 1, art. 69.

and objects necessary for religious worship." Protocol
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obligation. Accordingly, paragraph 1 was amended in a manner reminiscent of the bold proscription against starvation as a method of
warfare: if civilians are inadequately supplied, "relief actions ...
shall be undertaken."
Because of the use of the passive voice, the question arises, to
whom does the obligation apply? According to the authoritative
commentators, the obligation attaches to those providing relief, those
granting transit, and those receiving relief. Regarding potential donors, paragraph 1 arguably creates a duty, for states in a position
to do so, to make reasonable efforts to contribute to and facilitate
relief actions. Next, the obligation of the receiving party to accept
the relief appears uncontroversial. However, this duty is important
in that it prevents a state from arbitrarily denying entry of relief
consignments for reasons of internal politics, national pride, or unsupported security concerns. The final but most important obligation
is that attaching to the party granting transit, whether through its
territory or a blockade. The duty is unambiguously spelled out in
paragraph 2-the party shall allow passage of relief consignments,
even if destined for the civilian population of the adverse party.
Moreover, the blockading or besieging party must "facilitate" pas278
sage, suggesting that there is a duty to provide active assistance.
These nontrivial duties, particularly those placed on parties granting
transit, would probably be disregarded out of hand if no qualifications
in recognition of the realities of warfare had been added. The Working
Group addressed such concerns by adding the words "subject to the
agreement of the Parties concerned" to paragraph 1 immediately after
the language recognizing substantial duties. The remarks in Committee
II meetings indicated that the qualification, although opposed by
several delegations, was deemed necessary by the Working Group in
' 279
the "spirit of compromise.
Although the language of the paragraph 1 qualification might
suggest that a party has veto power (by simply refusing to agree), a
contextual analysis shows that this is not the case. First, the overall
thrust of the relief provisions is in the direction of improving civilian
2178The evolution of the "clearly defined obligation" regarding relief was discussed
in some depth in the meeting of Committee II of April 28, 1977. U.N. Doc. CDDH/
II/SR.87, 12 Official Records, supra note 237, at 333. See generally M. BOTHE, K.
PARTSCH & W. SOLF, supra note 127, at 433-34 (analyzing the contours of the
respective duties in the light of the negotiating history).
179 U.N. Doc. CDDH/II/SR.87,
12 Official Records, supra note 237, at 336
(remarks of Professor Bothe of the Federal Republic of Germany).
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protection. In addition, the article contains forceful language indicating that the duty to agree is by no means perfunctory. Thus, to
permit arbitrary refusal of relief would defeat the purpose of the
article. Moreover, the "subject to agreement" clause can be seen as
merely recognizing unavoidable practical considerations flowing from
notions of sovereignty and made more poignant by conflict. That is,
relief from outside depends a priori on obtaining permission from
the competent authorities in a given area to enter that area and
conduct relief work therein. The language of Article 70 therefore
suggests both a weighty duty to permit relief and an acknowledgment
that details must be agreed upon. Moreover, the statements of a
number of delegates reflect the understanding that the requirement
to make an agreement "was as strong as possible", and that relief
may be rejected only for compelling reasons, not for arbitrary and
capricious ones. 2 0 Finally, paragraph 2 underscores the obligation to
agree on terms by stating that, even if relief is destined for the civilian
population of the enemy, a party "shall allow and facilitate unimpeded passage.' '281
In further deference to the position of the party granting transit,
three additional conditions are stated in paragraph 1. First, the article
and its substantial duties apply only when the relief is necessarythat is, when the civilian population is not adequately supplied. If
this condition is not met, then the special protection would not apply
and transit decisions would be governed by other humanitarian law
principles such as those relating to contraband and acts directed at
civilian objects generally. Second, the relief actions must be "humanitarian and impartial" to draw the article's protection. Although
transit, under paragraph 2, may not be denied solely because the
goods are destined for the adverse party's civilians, the underlying
purpose of a relief action must not be that of giving undue advantage
to one side. The best-known relief agencies such as the ICRC and

280

U.N. Doc. CDDH/II/SR.87, 12 Official Records, supra note 237, at 336

(remarks of Mr. Gonsalves of the Netherlands). For similar comments see the
statements of Professor Bothe, Professor Solf, Mr. Krasnopeev (U.S.S.R.), and Mr.
Makin (U.K.) during the same Committee II meeting. Id.
281 M. BOTHE, K. PARTSCH & W. SOLF, supra note 127, at 434-35, point
out that
by the statutory construction principle lex specialis, paragraph 2 language prevails
over the suggestion that paragraph 1 allows arbitrary refusal to agree. Moreover,
by virtue of Article 54's proscription against starvation measures, a frivolous refusal

would appear to be a guise for impermissible denial of civilian sustenance as a
method of warfare.

1989]

CIVILIAN STARVATION

United Nations organs would be presumed to provide impartial relief
within the spirit of the article. Third, relief must be "conducted
without any adverse distinction," which means without any discrimination. 2 2 Finally, it is here suggested that these conditions were
intended to be construed narrowly, based not only on the overriding
humanitarian purpose of the article but also on the provision that
"such relief shall not be regarded as interference . . . or as unfriendly
acts." That is, as long as the relief is necessary and impartial, and
the relief actions are conducted without discrimination, the consignment may not be denied because of lesser, politically-motivated,

contentions .283
The party granting transit has substantial obligations respecting
consignments, to be sure. However, paragraph 3 of Article 70 also
grants that party the prerogative to protect its own security and
military interests. Thus, the transit party may prescribe technical
arrangements, including searches of relief supplies. Moreover, passage
may be conditioned upon supervision of distribution by a protecting
power, which is a neutral state or an organization accepted by both
sides to protect the interests of the enemy state in another's territory.2 14
In addition to affording protection for the transit state, these provisions provide alternative transit procedures to use in the event of
a party's recalcitrance. For example, if the transit state claims that
a consignment would be diverted to military use, the other party may
counter with a proposal for a protecting power to manage the relief.
Finally, an extremely narrow right to divert consignments from the
intended purposes is recognized "in cases of urgent necessity in the
interest of the civilian population concerned. ' 25 For example, al282Although no elaboration of "adverse distinction" appears in Article 70, the
essence of the concept is "without discrimination" as indicated by Article 9 of
Protocol I (in Part II: Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked). Article 9 states that
provisions are to be applied "without any adverse distinction founded on race,
colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar criteria." Protocol I,
supra note 1, art. 9.
283 See generally M. BOTHE, K. PARTSCH & W. SOLF, supra note 127, at 435
(recounting that the concerns of interference and violation of national pride were
expressed frequently during the Conference).
Ambassador Aldrich has called the protecting power the "backbone of the
Geneva Convention system" and has touted the provisions designed to make it more
likely that protecting powers will be appointed as one of the most impressive
accomplishments of Protocol I. For an overview of the issues surrounding protecting
powers, see Aldrich, New Life, supra note 1, at 765-68.
281 Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 70, para. 3(b).
184
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though the transit party would not be permitted to divert relief for
its own use, it would be allowed to delay passage to prevent destruction of the goods in a storm.
Receiving states also have important duties under Article 70. Paragraph 4 requires the receiving state to "protect and facilitate" rapid
distribution of relief consignments. Additional duties devolving upon
the receiving state are in paragraph 1, including the requirement to
give priority in distribution to the weaker parts of the population.
Perhaps more important, this provision affords some protection to
the transit party's interests in that it requires the receiving country
to adhere to the humanitarian purposes of Article 70 by not diverting
relief from these weaker elements of the population in favor of
weapons factory workers, for example. Finally, paragraph 5 flows
from the logistical complexities and political obstacles inherent in
relief actions during armed conflict. This provision implores parties
to foster "international co-ordination" in relief efforts so the purposes
of the article may be achieved.

286

The lack of an earlier convention dealing with the many issues
surrounding relief in non-occupied territory, combined with the need
to address myriad duties and to foresee labyrinthine factual scenarios,
led inevitably to a complex article. Nevertheless, through the diplomatic process the conferees shaped a regime that heeds the realities
of warfare and at the same time breathes life into the "basic principle
of humanity that the outside world does not stand idly by while the
civilian population in a country is suffering, starving and being deprived of basic supplies as a result of armed conflict.

2.

'27

Relief Personnel

Protocol I's important enunciation of protections for relief personnel is contained in Article 71,288 which provides:
Article 71 - Personnel Participating in Relief Actions
1. Where necessary, relief personnel may form part of the assistance
provided in any relief action, in particular for the transportation
and distribution of relief consignments; the participation of such
personnel shall be subject to the approval of the Party in whose
286 See generally U.N. Doc. CDDH/II/SR. 87, 12 Official Records, supra note
237, at 333-34 (including discussion and rejection of the proposal to include an
illustrative list of international bodies in paragraph 5).
287

M.

BOTHE,

288Protocol

K.

PARTSCH & W. SOLF,

I, supra note 1, art. 71.

supra note 127, at 432-33.

1989]

CIVILIAN STARVATION

territory they will carry out their duties.
2. Such personnel shall be respected and protected.
3. Each Party in receipt of relief consignments shall, to the fullest
extent practicable, assist the relief personnel referred to in paragraph
1 in carrying out their relief mission. Only in case of imperative
military necessity may the activities of the relief personnel be limited
or their movements temporarily restricted.
4. Under no circumstances may relief personnel exceed the terms
of their mission under this Protocol. In particular they shall take
account of the security requirements of the Party in whose territory
they are carrying out their duties. The mission of any of the personnel
who do not respect these conditions may be terminated.
Article 71 was the Committee II Working Group's solution to an
issue that was not addressed by the ICRC draft. 28 9 The Group recognized that an affirmation of a right to relief, and provision of
effective rules governing relief efforts during armed conflict, required
protection for relief personnel as well as enunciation of the duties
incumbent on relief workers. 290 Under general notions of protection
in traditional humanitarian law, personnel accompanying relief consignments in most cases would carry the status of neutral civilians.
As such, they would be immune from attack but would not necessarily
be allowed to pursue relief activities. 291 Accordingly, without more
substantial protection for relief personnel, the salutary relief passage
provisions of Article 70 could be hollow in practice.
The declaration in paragraph 2 that relief personnel "shall be
respected and protected" acknowledges and incorporates into the
regime a high standard of protection. The same words are used in
292
Protocol I articles dealing with medical personnel, for example.
Accordingly, a degree of protection similar to that afforded medical
personnel attaches to personnel engaged in bonafide relief efforts.
That is, not only must they not be knowingly attacked, they also
must not be "unnecessarily prevented from discharging their proper

19 See generally 4 H. LEVIE, supra note 275, at 25.
290 Id. Even expansive Civilians Convention protections covering occupied territories
did not address protection of relief personnel. Accordingly, the conferees adopted
Article 71 to fill this gap regarding both occupied and non-occupied territories.
291 A brief overview of the degree of protection afforded neutral civilians is provided
in M. BOTIE, K. PARTSCH & W. SOLF, supra note 127, at 438.
292 Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 12 (Protection of Medical Units).
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functions." 2 93 An additional underpinning of this high level of protection is in the paragraph 3 clause obligating the receiving state to
assist relief personnel "to the fullest extent practicable."
In a balancing approach similar to that used in the relief passage
provisions, Article 71 imposes qualifications on the protections afforded relief personnel. First, participation of relief personnel is
"subject to approval" by the transit or receiving state (or both)
depending on the nature of the duties to be performed. Although
the approval may not be arbitrarily denied, the approving state has
the right to require that certain precautions and terms be observed
just as in the case of relief consignments themselves. 294 Moreover,
personnel are required to be admitted as part of a relief action only
"[wjhere necessary" for transportation and distribution. Accordingly,
the mere fact that a relief consignment is deemed necessary under
Article 70 does not mean that relief personnel accompanying consignments will meet this additional test of necessity under Article 71.
Finally, under paragraph 4, a party is empowered to terminate the
mission of relief personnel who do not respect security requirements
or who exceed the terms of the relief mission.
The provision of specific and substantive protections for relief
personnel is a noteworthy development in humanitarian law. Despite
the fact that Article 71 filled a significant gap in the Civilians Convention coverage, however, a review of the negotiating documents
shows that the matter raised only scant discussion during the Conference. 295 Perhaps two points explain this absence of controversy.
First, the need to protect necessary relief personnel flowed naturally
from the Conference's obvious commitment to form a truly effective
regime for relief during warfare. Moreover, even though there was
no earlier codification of such a regime, the concerns and expectations
of the world community had undoubtedly changed a great deal since
the 1949 Geneva Conference. Thus, rather than reflecting new (and

293 M. BOTHE, K. PARTSCH & W. SOLF, supra note 127, at 118 (quoting U.S. and
U.K. field manuals that express the traditional interpretation of "respected and
protected").
294 See supra notes 279-81 and accompanying text.
293 U.N. Doc. CDDH/IlI/SR. 88, 12 Official Records, supra note 237, at 345
(Committee II meeting on Article 71 of Apr. 27, 1977). The Committee II proceedings
reflect mainly discussion about minor points of phraseology. The only substantive
contention came from a delegate indicating that Article 71 should contain stronger
language to stress the importance of relief. Id. at 347 (statement of Mr. Klein of
the Holy See).
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thus controversial) law, the provisions to a large degree represented
a cogent restatement of those concerns and expectations held in 1977.
Now that the specifics of the Protocol I articles on starvation and
relief have been examined in the context of the negotiating process,
the impact of the concepts in the development of humanitarian law
should be assessed. The inquiry thus turns now to the degree to
which these provisions, even if unratified, may be seen as reflective
of today's rules and customs of armed conflict.
V.

A.

THE PROTOCOL I ARTICLES ON CIVILIAN STARVATION AND RELIEF
AS REFLECTIVE OF THE RULES AND CUSTOMS GOVERNING ARMED
CONFLICT
Introduction

An analysis of the details and purposes of treaty provisions, even
those refined in multilateral processes, rather begs the question of how
a governing legal regime might be applied in real world situations.
Because Protocol I has been ratified by only 60 countries, 219 a key
issue as to its effect in future armed conflict is the extent to which it
can be viewed as reflective of the rules and customs of warfare extant
in the world today. No matter how efficacious its provisions may be,
they must embody the values and expectations of the world community
if they are to be recognized during conflict. As one commentator points
out, "the pages of history are strewn with moralistic documents which
failed in their usefulness because they attempted to establish an unattainable standard of conduct. "297 Therefore, in view of the gravity
of the matter of civilian sustenance during warfare, it is important to
examine the question of whether the Protocol provisions aptly reflect
the progressive development of humanitarian law based on the interests
of the world community.
B.

Customary Norms of InternationalLaw

There are difficulties inherent in attempts to explicate the norms of
customary international law that bear on any particular part of the
world legal order. "Customary law" concepts resist precise definition,
and any serious analysis must consider contextual matters such as the
values, interests and expectations of the parties concerned. Even the
296 See T. MERON, supra note 35, at 9 & n.23 (citing an official ICRC report
showing accessions and ratifications to Protocol I as of July 1986).
297 Parks, supra note 96, at 25 (footnote omitted).

GA. J. INT'L & Comip. L.

[Vol. 19:1

simplified but common definition of customary international lawconsistent state practice accompanied by opinio juris29 -suggests imprecision: the consistent practice of the many international players and
the degree to which those players consider themselves bound are by
no means facile matters to determine. 299 Moreover, the processes by
which states show adherence to a particular practice have changed
considerably in the United Nations era. It is therefore not uncommon
for the literature to reflect wide variations in opinion on what the law
is. The statement by Oppenheim long ago remains true today: "Many
of these . . . are mere fancies, the outcome either of what the respective
authors consider the law of nature, or of patriotic prejudice, or of
misunderstood authority, and the like.' '3""
The literature contains numerous approaches to the elusive question
of what constitutes customary international law, but the detailed examination of such studies is beyond the scope of this inquiry. Instead,
it is suggested that an analysis of the relevant underlying values and
context of the starvation and relief articles provides the appropriate
framework for their assessment. According to Professor McDougal,
to make a realistic assessment, one must be able to identify the following
specific components: (1)a policy content, (2) expectations of authority,
and (3) expectations of control.3 0 l In a humanitarian law context, the
analysis must consider the factual problem to which humanitarian law
is addressed as well as the extent to which the underlying policy
prerogatives of the participants are served by the regime.
In assessing rules in the rubric of community policies, a number of
other indicators or signposts may be relevant. Multilateral processes,
for example, can provide an invaluable litmus test.3" 2 During a multilateral conference, the extent of world community representation and
the degree of consensus reached are important considerations. Moreover, the culmination of the process often shows how well community

29, A brief description of these concepts is provided in Perluss & Hartman, Temporary Refuge: Emergence of a Customary Norm, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 551, 555-57
(1986). See also supra notes 171-75 and accompanying text (regarding customary
norm-creation in the United Nations era).
299 "[I]t is always difficult to extricate unwritten rules from the mass of pronouncements, attitudes, views and written rules posed by States." Cassese, supra
note 80, at 57 (footnote omitted).
00Oppenheim, The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method, 2 AM.
J. INT'L L. 334 (1908).
10,McDougal, supra note 29, at 23.
302 See generally Cassese, supra note 80, at 58-66 (addressing treaties and treatymaking processes as sources of international law).
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values have been served. Specifically, the number of signatures as well
as ratifications of a resulting instrument can be useful augurs of
community assent. Finally, the experience after completion of the
multilateral process is pertinent to the evaluation. In this vein, perhaps
the best glimpses of validity come through state actions consistent (or
inconsistent) with the rules contained in the instrument and through
pronouncements reflecting willingness (or unwillingness) to be bound
by its terms.
Of critical importance in a modern evaluation of community values
is the impact of international expressions in world organizations such
as the United Nations. It has been shown that although the weight
accorded resolutions is a matter of controversy, the force of a unanimous or near-unanimous world community expression through a General Assembly resolution has become increasingly substantial in the
post-War era. Finally, the writings of experts can be helpful, although
law is not necessarily made by "influential people . . . assert[ing] in
a very loud voice that it is law.''303 Nevertheless, the writers' views
' '3 4
often are "relevant communications. 0
With the foregoing guidelines in view, the inquiry now turns to the
policies and context of modern humanitarian law respecting starvation
and relief, and the degree to which Protocol I provisions reflect the
values of the world community.
C. Assessment of the Starvation and Relief Provisions
1. Relevant Policies and Interests
The fundamental policy reference in any humanitarian law context
is the unified concept of humanity and military necessity. It is said
that to be effective, rules of humanitarian law must accord due regard
to both perspectives. For present purposes, the foregoing examination
of military necessity in traditional humanitarian law is relevant. It was
shown that the international legal order circumscribes the concept of

McDougal, supra note 29, at 24.

303

3o1Professor McDougal cautions against looking narrowly at any particular source
in assessing international legal norms:
International law, like other law, is not made in any one way or from any
one source. It is not made by agreements only; nor by organizational
resolutions only; nor by practice only. It is not, most assuredly, made by

text writers saying that a policy is the law. International law is made by
the accumulation of all relevant communications.
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military necessity through restraints inherent in the concept and through
the evolution of additional, narrowing principles in the "humanity"
dimension of traditional humanitarian law of both the conventional
and customary varieties. Despite violations of the laws of armed conflict, it was concluded that the crucial tenets of civilian protection
emerged intact after World War II and were affirmed and embellished
in. many important ways by the Civilians Convention.
The policy of civilian protection, based on the long-standing immunity principle, has been shown to be an interest of increasingly
great concern to the international community in the post-War era.
Tragic armed conflicts have focused attention on the issues, and a
number of expressions of commitment to the immunity principle have
been made by the world community, most prominently in the form
of unanimous General Assembly resolutions. Moreover, it has been
shown that the immense development of human rights law reflects this
concern for populations not just during peacetime, but during armed
conflict as well. Some aspects of the burgeoning human rights jurisprudence bear acutely on issues of civilian starvation and relief, including key nonderogable rights and "new generation" human rights.
There has been an unmistakable strengthening of the humanity
interest in the world community's conception of civilian protections
since World War II, when perhaps the Lieber code and Hague concepts
of "military objective" gave some color of legitimacy to starvation of
and denial of relief to civilians in warfare. However, despite an expanding humanity principle, armed conflict continues in many areas
of the world. There is, therefore, a continuing, vital need for an
effective regime of humanitarian law. The question remains, then,
whether Protocol I provisions on starvation and relief not only reflect
the expanded values of humanity, but also continue to comport with
the demands of military necessity.
2. An Evaluation of the Protocol I Articles
It has been suggested that the validity and effectiveness of Protocol
I articles on starvation and relief depend largely on how these articles
serve all of the relevant community interests and policies. Moreover,
and perhaps as an aid to the policy analysis, there are certain indicators
of the vitality of a set of rules, particularly when the rules have been
formed by multilateral processes.
The first concern is whether the policy content is identifiable in the
rules.3 °5 Although Protocol I is lengthy and contains ambiguities, the
305

See supra text accompanying note 301.
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global constitutive process by which this multilateral instrument was
formulated helped to clarify the common interest reflected in it.3c 6 In
the starvation and relief provisions, despite the need for many paragraphs and clauses to meet the goal of providing a comprehensive and
balanced regime, there are nevertheless clear statements of general
principles. For example, Article 54 not only deals in some detail with
the matters that must be considered before an attack on civilian
sustenance objects, but it also unambiguously states the policy that
starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited. Similarly,
Article 70 articulates that, where necessary, humanitarian relief measures "shall be undertaken." Finally, it is provided in Article 71 that
relief personnel "shall be respected and protected."
In addition to enunciating broad principles of humanity, the provisions embody policy content respecting the "military necessity" part
of the humanitarian law calculus. For example, the proscription against
attacks on objects for the "purpose of denying them for their sustenance value" recognizes that such objects may be subject to attack
as military objects under certain circumstances. Moreover, the balancing
approach of all three of the articles, with conditions on the protections
stated in a number of particulars, reveals further evidence of "military
necessity" consideration.
Having established that the starvation and relief articles incorporate
rather clearly identifiable policy content, the inquiry turns to an evaluation of how well the community policies and interests are served by
the articles' provisions. In the foregoing section, it was suggested that
the crucial humanitarian law policies of humanity and military necessity
remained paramount. However, it was further suggested that special
priority has been added to the "humanity" interest.
In view of significant post-War enhancement of the humanity interest, perhaps the key question is whether the Protocol I provisions
go far enough in reflecting community concerns. Although some conferees expressed worry that clauses imposing conditions on, and permitting derogations from, the stated protections might dilute otherwise
salutary rules, 3°7 the starvation and relief articles are generally seen as
substantial advances in humanitarianism over earlier codifications. 08
The articles were crafted both to articulate appropriate principles and
to devise a legal regime aimed at ensuring respect for those principles

o McDougal, supra note 29, at 23.
01 See, e.g., supra note 295.
108See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 38.
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during armed conflict. It is concluded, then, that the reach of the
starvation and relief articles is sufficient to reflect community concern
for more humane treatment of civilians during warfare. In fact, the
provisions can and should be read as quite far-reaching, supported
firmly by the community priority of reducing the unnecessary civilian
suffering seen in World War II and subsequent conflicts, and by today's
manifest, extensive concern for human rights and global sustenance
problems.
Whether the "military necessity" interest has been preserved by
the starvation and relief articles is another matter of contention. One
commentator, for example, decries the fact that the provisions would
affect the conduct of sieges and blockades and contends that the
articles fail to provide clear enough guidelines for the field commander.3' 9 Given the fact that the humanity principles advanced by
the articles are well supported by community interests, the question
is whether the realities of warfare are sufficiently regarded.
In the foregoing examination of the articles, there was ample
evidence that the conferees took seriously both the philosophical and
practical needs to regard "military necessity". Despite the bold proscription carried in the starvation article, true military objectives are
excepted from the restriction in most cases, as are objects of sustenance identified as solely for military forces. One may argue that
the bans on indiscriminate starvation (i.e. of both military forces and
civilians) and on scorched earth practices of a retreating enemy represent departures from traditional notions of military necessity. However, it is suggested here that such destructive practices, and not the
new proscriptions, fail miserably in a modern analysis of community
values. First, these measures have shown at best only a tenuous
connection to achievement of military objectives. But more importantly, quickened by the tragic conflicts of the 1960s and the burgeoning human rights movement, the earlier response of revulsion to
such practices has changed to a consensus that they cannot be tolerated
in the modern humanitarian legal order. The starvation article is an
apt reflection of that consensus.
The relief provisions embody considerable protections for military
interests. Although humanitarian duties are clearly stated, so are

309 Roberts, supra note 4, at 150-55. But see Parks, supra note 96, at 25: "To
avoid the imposition of unrealistic restraints upon its armed forces, the Protocols
were the subject of detailed review by the Department of Defense and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff prior to their signature by the United States."
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detailed conditions respecting the realities of armed conflict. For
example, the transit party has the authority to set terms of passage
of consignments. Also, military necessity is directly addressed by the
provisions allowing measures to guard against security violations and
diversions of relief for use by enemy forces. Relief personnel are
subject to additional constraints. Although they must be respected
and protected, relief personnel have strict "marching orders" from
which they may not deviate. Moreover, relief personnel do not gain
entry as a matter of right along with passage of a relief consignment,
but only when their services are a necessary part of the relief effort.
In short, the relief provisions accord due regard to military necessity.
To the extent the rules complicate the conduct of military operations,
such complication is amply warranted by the crucial concerns of
humanity served by provision of relief to civilian populations in need.
Among the several additional indicators of whether a set of rules
reflects community interests is the multilateral process by which the
rules were promulgated. Protocol I was negotiated in a lengthy Conference with wide participation by the world community. Such a
process lends a certain imprimatur of validity to the policies embodied
in the resulting instrument. With respect to the starvation and relief
articles, the negotiating papers show consensus in a number of ways.
First, these provisions were by no means given short shrift; rather,
they were scrutinized carefully and reworked considerably by Working
Groups during the Conference. Then, once the various concerns were
incorporated into the draft articles by the Working Groups, the
provisions were adopted by the respective committees by consensus
after discussion revealed no major disagreements. Finally, all of the
provisions were adopted by the entire Conference in plenary session,
also by consensus. In view of the foregoing, it is suggested that the
exhaustive multilateral process that yielded consensus on these articles
signifies a high degree of congruity between the provisions and community values. 10
The signing of Protocol I by sixty-two states, including the United
States, is another significant factor. Although merely signing did not
See also Cassese, supra note 80, at 92-93:
The adoption of [Article 54] by consensus, the lack of any reservation,
and the implicit acknowledgment of the humanitarian principle that civilians
should not suffer unduly from the rigors of war, all indicate that the
provision was the subject of such broad consensus that it came to regarded
as a rule of general application.
Id. (footnote omitted).
310
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bind the signatories to the Protocol, a colorable duty arose at least
not to defeat the object and underlying policies of the instrument. 1
Moreover, a large number of signatures shows community assent to
3 12
the principles of the agreement.
In the noise of controversy over whether the United States should
ratify Protocol I, it is easy to lose sight of the importance of the
accession to the agreement by sixty states. That is, the fact that
Protocol I is in force for these countries is indicative of assent by
a significant number of states to the whole of Protocol I. But more
important for present purposes, complaint about the starvation and
relief articles is rarely heard in discussions on why more countries
have not ratified Protocol I. In fact, as Ambassador Aldrich stated
in response to one of the few complaints in the literature about these
provisions, Article 54 was among the provisions "most warmly welcomed by the United States in 1977."' 3 Also, the change from a
Democratic to a Republican Administration, which appears to have
been a major factor in the shift in U.S. position on Protocol I, did
not bring a change in view on the starvations and relief provisions.
The remarks of Michael J. Matheson, Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S.
Department of State, reflect the Reagan Administration view:
We support the principle that starvation of civilians not be used as
a method of warfare, and, subject to the requirements of imperative
military necessity, that impartial relief actions necessary for the
survival of the civilian population be permitted and encouraged.
These principles can be found, though in a somewhat different form,
in Articles 54 and 70.314

3, See Rogoff, The InternationalLegal Obligations of Signatories to an Unratified
Treaty, 32 ME. L. REv. 263 (1980).
312 See Wortley,
Observations on the Revision of the 1949 Geneva "Red Cross"
Conventions, 54 BmRr. Y.B. INT'L L. 143, 163 (1983):
We have seen that the Protocols do not become treaties upon signature;
they do, however, have a normative effect on the development of the
customary law of war and therefore cannot be ignored by international
lawyers and the military commanders in the field, for they are designed to
protect human rights and good faith demands that this purpose should be
borne in mind when they come to be used as criteria for conduct.
Id.
311Aldrich, supra note 4, at 699. In addressing the military objections of Major
Roberts (see supra note 4), Ambassador Aldrich also detailed the high degree of
U.S. military participation in the Conference (including Major Generals Walter D.
Reed and George S. Prugh in "key negotiating roles"). Id. at 695.
314 M. Matheson, Remarks at the Symposium on International Humanitarian Law
at the Washington College of Law, American University (Jan. 22, 1987) (extract on
file with the author).
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Therefore, it is a reasonable conclusion that, if it were not for areas
of contention unrelated to the rules on starvation and relief, the U.S.
and perhaps many other states would have already bound themselves
to those rules by accession to Protocol I. Concomitantly, it may be
concluded that these states are willing to be bound by the starvation
and relief provisions even without acceding to the Protocol.
CONCLUSION

The analysis has shown that the Protocol I articles on starvation
and relief are in large measure congruent with current international
consensus on the priorities to be observed in armed conflict. The
provisions embody clear policy content that comports with current
community interests and values. The undeniably strong interest in
advancing humanitarian treatment of civilians during warfare, rendered even more urgent by the devastation of the most recent conflicts,
is amply reflected in the articles. Beyond general concern for civilian
suffering, these provisions focus on the population's basic needs for
survival. As such, the protections find further support in the "immense development of human rights law" since 1945. At the same
time, however, the requirements of military necessity are served.
Appropriate conditions on the protections are specified in acknowledgment of the realities of warfare. Accordingly, despite the powerful
humanitarian interests that are addressed, the legal regime does not
sink under the weight of unattainable standards. The multilateral
consensus process that gave rise to the provisions, along with postConference writings and government pronouncements, underscore the
assessment that the interests of the world community are well served.
It is finally suggested that to call these provisions effective legal
norms for the 1980s and beyond is not "fancy," "misunderstood
authority", but rather an accurate assessment of post-World War II
progressive development in international humanitarian law.

